Understanding Russia's Uranium Enrichment Complex

Abstract

Abstract Over a period of 50 years, the Soviet Union (and now Russia) has developed a highly-efficient centrifuge technology and a large R&D and industrial complex to produce enriched uranium for nuclear weapons (in the past) and nuclear reactors. The enrichment complex is a crown jewel of the Russian nuclear complex and will remain significant for Russia's economy. Because of its role in the 1993 U.S.-Russian HEU agreement, global nuclear markets, and efforts to control the spread of centrifuge enrichment technology, the Russian enrichment enterprise is also of significant importance to international security. Notes *Differences between the "sales" and "production" figures could reflect the differences between contractual obligations and the actual amount of work expended to produce the product. In the case of the HEU agreement, the "sales" figure is the calculated SWU content in LEU deliveries whereas the "production" figure relates to Minatom's work to produce the blendstock. **Production cost is calculated based on the $20/SWU extimate. ***SWU spot market price in the fall 2003. *A. Panasyuk, A. Vlasov, S. Koshelev, T. Shea, D. Perricos, D. Yang, and S. Chen, "Tripartite Enrichment Project: Safeguards at Enrichment Plants Equipped with Russian Centrifuges," IAEA-SM-367/8/02 (IAEA, 2001). 1. In March 2004, Minatom became the Russian Federation Agency for Atomic Energy. 2. For a more detailed discussion of the Soviet/Russian centrifuge program see: Oleg Bukharin Russia's Gaseous Centrifuge Technology and Enrichment Complex, Program on Science and Global Security's report (Princeton, 2004). 3. In a molecular pump, a high rotational speed rotor imparts momentum to the gas molecules: the pumping action thus is achieved at a molecular level by bouncing gas molecules off the rotor and the stator. In a centrifuge, the role of a stator is played by a close-fitting spiral grooved sleeve located around the upper portion of the centrifuge rotor (which also serves as the pump's rotor). This molecular pump system evacuates all leakages of the UF6 gas to the top region of the centrifuge from where the gas is removed by an external vacuum system. 4. A high-speed rotation of a sufficiently long tube with a small diameter results in flexural (transverse) resonances. These resonances occur at critical speeds that are determined by the rotor's design and characteristics of materials it is made of (density and elasticity). A centrifuge operating at a speed below that of its first flexural resonance (a short centrifuge) is termed subcritical. A centrifuge operating at speeds above the first resonance is termed "supercritical." A supercritical rotor with a high length-to-diameter ratio could pass through several critical resonance frequencies on its way to the designed high rotational speed. Unless the rotor is carefully balanced and unless vibrations are controlled by the use of damping measures, the rotor could be destroyed while traversing these critical frequencies. 5. Vladimir Bazhenov and Yuri Zabelin, "The Creation and Development of the Centrifuge Method for Isotope Separation," UEKhK Information Newsletter, No. 3 (18 February 1999). 6. B. Bazhenov and Yu. Zabelin, "The Creation and Development of the Centrifuge Method for Isotope Separation," UEKhK Information Bulletin (18 February 1999). 7. Yu. Verbin, "Development of Chemical and Technological Facilities and Environmental Protection," Atompressa, 40 (November 1998). 8. V. Safutin, Yu. Verbin, and V. Tolstoi, "The Status and Perspectives of Separation Production," Atomnaia Energiia, vol. 89, No. 4 (October 1, 2000), 338–343. 9. Victor Mikhailov, "The Nuclear Industry in Russia," presented at The Twenty-Second International Symposium, The Uranium Institute, London, 1997 (available at: www.world-nuclear.org/sym/1997/mikhail.htm). 10. As of 2000, the Gen 5, 6, and 7 centrifuges accounted for 48, 49, and 3 percent of the total, respectively. UEKhK operated Gen 5, 6, 7 centrifuges; EKhZ operated Gen 5, 6, 7 centrifuges; SKhK operated Gen 5 and 6 centrifuges; and AEKhK operated Gen 6 centrifuges. V. Safutin, Yu. Verbin, and V. Tolstoi, "The Status and Perspectives of Separation Production," Atomnaia Energiia, vol. 89, No. 4 (October 1, 2000), 338–343. 11. V. Shidlovsky, "On the Prospects and Plans for Modernizing Enrichment Facilities," Atompressa, 36 (September 2000). 12. Ibid. 13. "To Meet Modern Requirements: Interview with Vladimir Korotkevich," available at: www.minatom.ru/presscenter/document/news/PRINT_news344.htm. 14. V. Safutin, Yu. Verbin, and V. Tolstoi, "The Status and Perspectives of Separation Production," Atomnaia Energiia, vol. 89, No. 4 (October 1, 2000), 338–343. 15. V. Shidlovsky, "On the Prospects and Plans for Modernizing Enrichment Facilities," Atompressa, 36 (September 2000). 16. V. Safutin, Yu. Verbin, and V. Tolstoi, "The Status and Perspectives of Separation Production," Atomnaia Energiia, vol. 89, No. 4 (October 1, 2000) 338–343. 17. For example, according to E. Mikerin, V. Bazhenov, and G. Solovyev, "Directions in the Development of Uranium Enrichment Technology," (Minatom, undated), at least 10 million SWU/y were available for exports in the early 1990s. 18. UEKhK's presentation at the workshop on downsizing of the Minatom nuclear weapons complex; Obninsk, 27–29 June 2000. 19. For an analysis of cost production see Matthew Bunn, "The Cost of Rapid Blend-Down of Russian HEU," July 11, 2001. Interestingly, at least as of 2000, neither the enrichment facilities nor Minatom knew their SWU production cost; see, V. Shidlovsky, "On the Prospects and Plans for Modernizing Enrichment Facilities," Atompressa, 36 (September 2000). 20. For Minatom capacity breakdown data, see, for example, V. Shidlovsky "On the Prospects and Plans for Modernizing Enrichment Facilities," Atompressa, 36 (September 2000). 21. A small portion of requirements is covered by western suppliers and by reprocessed uranium recovered at the Mayak complex from VVER-440 spent fuel and sweetened by medium- or highly-enriched uranium. 22. Dr. Arthur Max, Nukem, personal communication, 2003. 23. A. Novikov "30 Years of Russian Uranium Exports: Interview with A. Knutarev," Atompressa, 16 (2003). 24. Minatom's primary competitors and their 2002 share of the world's enrichment market are USEC (18%), Eurodif (23%), and Urenco (15%). Japan and China also seek a bigger role in the enrichment market. (Jean-Jacques Gautrot, "The Harmonious Market for Uranium Enrichment Services," presented at World Nuclear Association Annual Symposium, September 4–6, 2002, London; www.world-nuclear. org/sym/2002/pdf/gautrot.pdf.) The Euratom Procurement Agency restricts imports of enriched uranium from Russia to 25%. In 2002, Russian supplies accounted for 14% of the EU enrichment requirements. ("Euratom Releases Annual Report 2002," The Ux Weekly [June 9, 2003]). The United States prohibits imports of any Russian enrichment services with the exception of those contained in HEU-derived LEU delivered under the 1993 HEU agreement. 25. Jean-Jacques Gautrot, "The Harmonious Market for Uranium Enrichment Services," presented at World Nuclear Association Annual Symposium, September 4–6, 2002, London; www.world-nuclear.org/sym/2002/pdf/gautrot.pdf. 26. Daniel Horner, "Conferees Nix Plan to Fund Downblending of More Russian HEU," Nuclear Fuel (10 November 2003), 1, 14. 27. "Russian-U.S. HEU Agreement," Nuclear Fuel (March 1, 1993). 28. Because Russian HEU was produced from reprocessed uranium it contains traces of transuranic elements (plutonium, americium, curium) and fission products. Additional amounts of americium and plutonium might have been acquired due to metal diffusion in composite HEU/plutonium warhead components. Initially (in 1994), Russian experts suggested that a reasonable level of alpha-activity (from Pu-238/239 and Np-237) for HEU-derived LEU would be 0.1 Bq/gU; the suggested limit for gamma-activity from fission products was 1.1x105 MeV/sec/kgU; Michael Knapik, "ASTM to Develop New Standard for Blended-Down HEU from Weapons," Nuclear Fuel (28 March 1994). 29. The reactor-origin isotope uranium-232 presents an occupational safety problem because it decays into bismuth-212 and tellurium-208, both high-energy gamma emitters. Uranium-236, also formed in a nuclear reactor, is a neutron poison and its presence in reactor fuel has to be compensated by higher levels of enrichment in uranium-235. Uranium-234 is a natural isotope. Its concentration in HEU is, however, relatively high due to a preferential enrichment of lighter isotopes. Because uranium-234 is a strong alpha emitter, there are restrictions on its concentration in uranium. Russia's proposal was to set the following limits for blended-down HEU: 0.002 mcgU-232/gU-235, 11,000 mcgU-234/gU-235 (the limit imposed by ASTM C 996-90 for commercial grade uranium is 10,000 mcgU-234/gU-235), and 10,000 mcgU-236/gU-235; Ibid. 30. Unless HEU is blended with uranium depleted in uranium-234 (such as uranium derived from uranium enrichment tailings) the concentration of uranium-234 in HEU-derived LEU is higher compared to LEU produced from natural uranium. 31. The contract covers only the enrichment component of the LEU product delivered to USEC. Payments for the natural uranium component contained in the LEU were a considerable problem for many years. In 2001, however, an arrangement was agreed upon under which two Western companies (Cameco and Nukem) have a first right to buy uranium. After that, USEC returns an used portion of natural uranium to Russia. 32. "Peaceful Atom in Private Hands Could Result in Economic Wars Abroad and a Full Collapse of the Industry at Home," Rossiyskaya Gazeta (5 June 1998), 4. 33. The revenues from the LEU sales are directed to the Russian budget (the Ministry of Finance). Minatom, the Ministry of Finance, the Ministry of the Economic Development, and other elements of the Russian government then negotiate the disbursement of the HEU revenues. Reportedly, approximately 80 percent of the revenues are returned to Minatom which, in turn, reimburses the downblending facilities in the amount of the cost of production plus 20–25 percent award. The rest of Minatom's moneys are placed into the Special Minatom Fund, which is used to cover the Ministry's overhead as well as to support defense conversion, nuclear safety and security, social security, and other industry-wide programs. 34. See for example, "Top Ten Stories of 2003," The Ux Weekly (22 December 2003). 35. "Integrated Nuclear Power Development Program for 1993–2000 and to 2010" (Minatom, 1992). 36. Dr. Arthur Max, Nukem, personal communication, 2003. 37. Ibid. 38. Ibid. 39. Nikolai Egorov, Vladimir Novikov, Frank Parker, and Victor Popov, (eds.), The Radiation Legacy of the Soviet Nuclear Complex (London: Earthscan Publications Ltd, 2000). 40. The principal participants in this project are the four enrichment facilities, the TRINITY center, the Institue of Energy Technologies (VNIPIET, St. Petersburg), and the Institute of Energy Problems. See: Atompressa, 44 (November 2000). 41. Oana Diaconu and Michael Maloney, "Russian Commercial Nuclear Initiatives and U.S. Nonproliferation Interests," Nonproliferation Review (Spring 2003): 97–112. 42. The 2002 contract between USEC and Tenex established a new, reduced SWU price. The level of payments to Russia is likely to decline considerably as a result. 43. Oana Diaconu and Michael Maloney "Russian Commercial Nuclear Initiatives and U.S. Nonproliferation Interests," Nonproliferation Review (Spring 2003): 97–112. 44. "Russia-PRC Nuclear Power Development Cooperation: Traditions, Real Results, Problems, and Prospects," Atompressa, 11 (March 1998). 45. Platts Nov. 12, 2001; Nuclear Fuel, May 17, 1999. ⟨www.antenna.nl/wise/uranium/ eproj.html#LANZHOUCENT⟩. 46. "Russia-PRC Nuclear Power Development Cooperation: Traditions, Real Results, Problems, and Prospects," Atompressa, 11 (March 1998). 47. "Information," Yaderny Kontrol, 1 (January 1995). 48. Reportedly, Minatom is selling to China its older, overstock centrifuges. See: "Hanzhun Enrichment Facility," at ⟨http://www.nti.org/db/china/hanzhun.htm⟩. 49. Quoted in "Information," Yaderny Kontrol, 1 (January 1995). 50. Personal communication with a Russian enrichment expert, June 2000. 51. Anton Khlopkov "The Iranian Nuclear Program in the Russian-American Relations" (PIR Center: Moscow, 2001). 52. "Russia ID'd as an Iran Atomic Supplier," Associated Press (20 November 2003); "Minatom Denies Russian Participation in Supplying Iran with Equipment for Enriching Uranium," Interfax (20 November 2003). The articles are available at ⟨www.ransac.org/Projects and Publications/News/NuclearNews/1120200343218PM. html#2G⟩. 53. "People in the South Urals Phone the FSB," Chelyabinskii Rabochii (27 October 2000). 54. One proposed criteria of the weapons origin of the HEU was its age. It was argued that HEU age could be determined by measuring the daughter products, Th-230 and Pa-231, of U-234 and U-235, respectively, by first chemical separation of the daughter products and measuring them by alpha-spectrometry. (A. R. Moorthy and W. Y. Kato, "HEU Age Determination," paper presented at the 35th Institute of Nuclear Material Management Annual Symposium, Naples, FL, July 17–20, 1994.) 55. P. Herman et al. "Sharing the Challenges of Nonproliferation," Science and Technology Review (September 1997): 14–23. 56. At Portsmouth, Russian monitors verify the receipt of 30B containers with LEU UF6, container storage, sample withdrawal and analysis, and MC&A data. See Wilson Dizard III "Enrichment News," Nuclear Fuel (18 November 1996): 4. 57. Andrew Bieniawski and Vladislav Balamutov, "HEU Purchase Agreement," Journal of Nuclear Materials Management (February 1997): 7–8.