COOPERATION, COOPTATION, AND REBELLION UNDER DICTATORSHIPS

TLDR

Dictatorships vary, with some purely autocratic and others incorporating democratic institutions, and dictators can influence outcomes through policy concessions or rent sharing. The study develops a model explaining how dictators’ need for cooperation and threat of rebellion shape their use of policy concessions and rent sharing. The authors test the model by statistically analyzing all dictatorships from 1946 to 1996, assuming policy concessions depend on legislatures and parties. The results show that dictators needing more cooperation issue larger concessions and share fewer rents, whereas those facing higher rebellion threats make larger concessions and distribute more spoils.

Abstract

Dictatorships are not all the same: some are purely autocratic but many exhibit a full panoply of seemingly democratic institutions. To explain these differences, we develop a model in which dictators may need cooperation to generate rents and may face a threat of rebellion. Dictators have two instruments: they can make policy concessions or share rents. We conclude that when they need more cooperation dictators make more extensive policy concessions and share fewer rents. In turn, when the threat of rebellion is greater, they make larger concessions but also distribute more spoils. Assuming that policy concessions require an institutional setting of legislatures and parties, we test this prediction statistically for all dictatorships that existed between 1946 and 1996.