Journal of money credit and banking · 1998 · 98 citations · 19 references
BusinessFinanceFinancial ManagementAgency TheoryBankingCorporate FinanceBanking RegulationCommercial BankingFinancial IntermediationFinancial UnderwritingLoan UnderwritingRelationship BankingAgency Problems In FinancingCommercial Loan UnderwritingCommercial UnderwritingDebt UnderwritingFirm Lending RelationshipsReputation BuildingScopeSecurities Finance
The authors study the issue of commercial bank underwriting of securities. Their analysis examines the incentive conflict faced by intermediaries that both lend and underwrite securities, thereby imposing a cost on their customers seeking to raise capital. Despite this cost, firms may choose to use such an intermediary if there are sufficiently large scope economies in combined lending and underwriting. The authors demonstrate that the regulatory separation of such combined intermediation may be optimal if firms recognize the intermediary's subsequent incentive conflict when choosing projects to be funded and if there is a social cost to bank funding of poor quality projects. They also examine the conditions for intermediaries' reputation building to mitigate the incentive conflict, without the need for regulation.
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Financial Intermediation and Delegated Monitoring
Douglas W. Diamond · The Review of Economic Studies · 1984 · 8.5K citations
Initial Public Offerings and Underwriter Reputation
Richard Carter, Steven Manaster · The Journal of Finance · 1990 · 2.6K citations