Dual-Process Theories of Higher Cognition

TLDR

Dual‑process theories in cognitive and social psychology face criticism for being treated as a generic category and for mischaracterizing the distinct role of Type 2 processes, which support hypothetical thinking and heavily load working memory. The study aims to identify and address five principal criticisms of dual‑process theories. The authors adopt a model where Type 1 rapid, autonomous processes generate default responses that are overridden by higher‑order Type 2 reasoning. The authors find that while some criticisms hold weight, they are overstated, and recent evidence largely supports the dual‑processing distinction.

Abstract

Dual-process and dual-system theories in both cognitive and social psychology have been subjected to a number of recently published criticisms. However, they have been attacked as a category, incorrectly assuming there is a generic version that applies to all. We identify and respond to 5 main lines of argument made by such critics. We agree that some of these arguments have force against some of the theories in the literature but believe them to be overstated. We argue that the dual-processing distinction is supported by much recent evidence in cognitive science. Our preferred theoretical approach is one in which rapid autonomous processes (Type 1) are assumed to yield default responses unless intervened on by distinctive higher order reasoning processes (Type 2). What defines the difference is that Type 2 processing supports hypothetical thinking and load heavily on working memory.