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A Theory of Coalition Formation
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1961
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Collective Action ProblemNon-cooperative Game TheoryN-person Game TheoryDescriptive TheoryGame TheorySociologyBusinessCooperative Game TheoryCooperative GameCoalition FormationPolitical ScienceSocial Sciences
Coalition formation is a pervasive aspect of social life. The paper develops a theory of coalition formation by articulating its conditions and assumptions. The theory aligns with Caplow’s triad coalition theory, accounts for Vinacke and Arkoff’s experimental data, yet ultimately falls short of offering a descriptive foundation for n‑person coalition theory.
Coalition formation is a pervasive aspect of social life. This paper presents a theory of coalition formation with a statement of conditions and assumptions. While applicable to groups of varying sizes, it is shown to be consistent with Caplow's theory of coalitions in the triad. It successfully handles the experimental results of Vinacke and Arkoff. Finally, the applicability of various work in n-person game theory is discussed with the conclusion that, in its present state, it fails to provide a basis for a descriptive theory of coalitions.