China Journal of Accounting Studies · 2013 · 14 citations · 61 references
ManagementCorporate GovernanceFinanceAgency TheoryCapital StructureCorporate FinanceCapital Structure DeterminantsCapital Structure ManagementCapital Structure TheoryDebt FinancingLeverage DecisionsOwnership StructureAgency Benefits Of DebtConduct Of State-owned EnterprisesControlling Shareholder ExpropriationCorporate Debt FinancingCorporate Debt StructureCorporate Ownership StructureExpropriation Of Minority ShareholdersOwnership Structure Effects
We provide direct evidence on the dark side of leverage and offer new insights regarding the role of debt in corporate governance. Using a sample of Chinese state-owned enterprises that have experienced a transfer of controlling rights, we find a positive and significant relationship between expropriation and debt usage. Firms controlled by private block shareholders tend to have higher leverage due to excessive expropriation via debt. The evidence we document provides fresh insights into the impact of debt on the agency problem between the controlling shareholder and minority shareholders, and suggests the presence of expropriation through debt and its conditional effect on corporate ownership.
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Agency Costs of Free Cash Flow, Corporate Finance, and Takeovers
Michael C. Jensen · American Economic Review · 1986 · 17.6K citations
Determinants of corporate borrowing
Stewart C. Myers · Journal of Financial Economics · 1977 · 13.4K citations
Corporate Ownership Around the World
Florencio López‐de‐Silanes, Andrei Shleifer · The Journal of Finance · 1999 · 10.7K citations · Full text