Individual Properties in Aristotle's Categories

Abstract

1. At Categories 1 a 23-29,1 Aristotle marks off a set of items which are present in but not predicable of a subject. Thus, for example, a certain knowledge of grammar (7 't ypo Cp-,urtxJ) is present in a subject, the soul, and a certain white (-ro4 i Xeux6v) present in a subject, the body; but neither is predicable of a subject. Such items are not predicable of a subject because they are particular or individual: ' -q ypOC[Lrxvnx and ro' rt ??ux6'v parallel o -d' A and Aristotle, after remarking that nothing prevents what is individual and one in number from being present in a subject (lb 7-8), cites as his example a certain knowledge of grammar. But what is individual and one in number is not predicable of a subject (lb6-7). However, not everything present in a subject is individual and one in number, for some things present in a subject are also predicable of a subject (la29-lb3); thus for example knowledge is in a subject, the soul, and predicable of a subject, knowledge of grammar. These two sets of items, what is both predicable of and present in a subject, and what is present in but not predicable of a subject, correspond, respectively, to the genera or species of individuals in categories other than substance,2 and to the individuals themselves.3 What is present in a subject as individual and one in number is incapable of existing apart from the particular subject it is in; for at 1 a 24-25, Aristotle defines presence as follows: By present in a subject I mean what is in something, not as a part, but as incapable of existing separately from what it is in. It would seem to follow from this that an item present in an individual subject is itself individual, and numerically distinct from items present in other individual subjects. Suppose this is so. Then if there are two pieces of chalk, A and B,