DESCARTES AND INDIVIDUAL CORPOREAL SUBSTANCE

Abstract

This essay explores the vexed issue of individual corporeal substance in Descartes's natural philosophy.Although Descartes often referred to individual material objects as separate substances, the constraints on his definitions of matter and substance would seem to favor the opposite view; namely, that there exists only one corporeal substance, the plenum.In contrast to this standard interpretation, however, it will be demonstrated that Descartes's hypotheses can provide a fairly convincing case for the existence of individual material substances; and the key to this new found individuation lies in a crucial set of passages from the Principles of Philosophy.implications, of Descartes's hypotheses, but also on his actual use of substance terminology as regards material objects.All in all, while not free from inconsistencies, the long-perplexing issue of individuation in Descartes's material world is both more coherent and successful than its many critics have charged.