The Journal of Finance · 1998 · 102 citations · 22 references
BusinessCorporate GovernanceFinanceBank RegulationBankingCorporate FinanceBank Corporate GovernanceBank MergersBanking RegulationMerger RegulationMergers And AcquisitionsTakeover RegulationBank ConsolidationBanking DeregulationBanking MergersCorporate Control MechanismsCorporate Control StructuresCorporate Control SystemsDeregulationManagerial Entrenchment In Mergers
This paper uses interstate banking deregulation to explore the benefits of takeover deregulation and how these benefits are distributed across different firms. We find large and significant abnormal returns around the Interstate Banking and Branching Efficiency Act of 1994 which imply it created $85 billion of value in the banking industry. Consistent with an active market for corporate control allowing beneficial consolidation and providing needed discipline, there is a strong negative relationship between banks' abnormal returns and their prior performance. Consistent with managerial entrenchment limiting takeover discipline, banks with higher insider ownership, lower outside block ownership, and/or less independent boards have lower abnormal returns.
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Large Shareholders and Corporate Control
Andrei Shleifer, Robert W. Vishny · Journal of Political Economy · 1986 · 8.6K citations
Managerial control of voting rights
René M. Stulz · Journal of Financial Economics · 1988 · 2.6K citations
Mergers and the Market for Corporate Control
Henry G. Manne · Journal of Political Economy · 1965 · 2.3K citations
Takeover Threats and Managerial Myopia
Jeremy C. Stein · Journal of Political Economy · 1988 · 1.7K citations · Full text