The Struggle for an Independent Aceh: The Ideology, Capacity, and Strategy of GAM

Abstract

Abstract On 9 December 2002, the Indonesian government and the Aceh Sumatra National Liberation Front (ASNLF), otherwise known as Gerakan Aceh Merdeka (GAM), agreed to a Cessation of Hostilities. This agreement was the product of a negotiation process that started in early 2000 with the aim of ending the separatist conflict occurring in Aceh since 1976. The two years leading up to this agreement were riddled with difficulties, including the collapse of the first cease-fire-the May 2000 Humanitarian Pause. The December 2002 cessation of hostilities fared only marginally better. While the moni­toring mechanism had been somewhat improved, the fact that there was no agreement on the key substantive issues, such as the question of sovereignty, undermined its imple­mentation. As a result, only six months after its conclusion the cease fire was dead in all but name. Last minute efforts to revive it at a meeting in Tokyo on 17 May failed. Two days later, on 19 May, Indonesia declared martial law in Aceh and gave the green light for a military operation. While the problems in the negotiations are of course the product of policies and dynamics on both sides, this article focuses only on GAM in order to increase the understanding of this national liberation movement and to ascertain to what extent the organization's history, ideology, structure, and politico-military strategy have made reaching a compromise difficult.