Russia's experiments and experience in conflict management and peacemaking

Abstract

The emerging pattern of Russia's peacemaking in the former USSR raises a number of issues. First is the conflicting trajectories of official rhetoric on the one hand, and the military realities of intervention on the other. While in 1992 the rhetoric was quite restrained and the Russian military adopted an interventionist posture, by 1994 the former had become remarkably bellicose and the latter had turned somewhat cautious. The second issue is the competition between the unilateral and multilateral approaches to peacemaking. The former has been a clear winner, while the latter has produced the formal umbrella of the Commonwealth of Independent States. The third issue is the rapidly increasing gap between the political requirements for interventions and the military capabilities for implementing them. The conclusion warns that the Russian leadership might possibly attempt to overcome its current problems with yet another intervention ‐ this time in Crimea.