The Perils of Unearned Foreign Income: Aid, Remittances, and Government Survival

Faisal Z. Ahmed

American Political Science Review · 2012 · 435 citations · 32 references

Concepts

TL;DR

Autocratic governments can use foreign aid and remittances to finance patronage and extend their tenure. The study tests whether unearned foreign income prolongs autocratic rule by analyzing government turnover in 97 countries from 1975 to 2004. The authors employ duration models and a natural experiment using oil‑price driven aid and remittance flows to non‑oil Muslim autocracies to address endogeneity. Results show that unearned foreign income lowers the likelihood of government turnover, regime collapse, and political discontent, and that autocrats reduce welfare spending to fund patronage.

Abstract

Given their political incentives, governments in more autocratic polities can strategically channel unearned government and household income in the form of foreign aid and remittances to finance patronage, which extends their tenure in political office. I substantiate this claim with duration models of government turnover for a sample of 97 countries between 1975 and 2004. Unearned foreign income received in more autocratic countries reduces the likelihood of government turnover, regime collapse, and outbreaks of major political discontent. To allay potential concerns with endogeneity, I harness a natural experiment of oil price–driven aid and remittance flows to poor, non–oil producing Muslim autocracies. The instrumental variables results confirm the baseline finding that authoritarian governments can harness unearned foreign income to prolong their rule. Finally, I provide evidence of the underlying causal mechanisms that governments in autocracies use aid and remittances inflows to reduce their expenditures on welfare goods to fund patronage.

References

32