Pleasure and Activity in Aristotle's Ethics

Abstract

In both of his main discussions of pleasure (in books VII and X of our Nicomachean Ethics) Aristotle associates pleasure very closely with a special kind of kvtQyFta, a word which I shall translate (following Ross)' as 'activity'. In book VII the special activities in question are said to be those that are activities of the natural state (r'ff xatai qp6ov 'Etew) and are unimpeded (V on the rival interpretation, it is an 'extra' fact, but one that is invariably present when the activity is complete.) For my purpose, I do not need to enter into this dispute, for on either view the doctrine of book X is that there is pleasure where and only where there is a complete activity. But what does Aristotle mean, in this context, by a 'complete activity' (XckXlEa Mv(QyFLa)? He does indeed tell us something of what he here means by 'completeness', but he gives no explanation of 'activity', and we have to conjecture his intentions from hints and probabilities. But if my own conjecture is right then Aristotle's account of pleasure is even more surprising than it is usually taken to be. I shall concentrate mainly upon the account in book X, since it is fuller, more clearly organised, and (on the whole) better argued. (It is also, I