The Need for Influence Theory and Actor-Specific Behavioral Models of Adversaries

Abstract

This article discusses problems of employing deterrence and coercive diplomacy in intra-state conflicts, drawing on those aspects of experience with these strategies during the Cold War relevant for dealing with intra-state conflicts, and adding some reflections on problems of employing these strategies in the post-Cold War environment. The special characteristics of intra-state conflicts, identified in this analysis, call attention to the need for several types of indirect deterrence and coercive diplomacy. Emphasis is placed on including deterrence and coercive diplomacy within a broader influence framework that considers the utility and sometimes the necessity for coupling these strategies with positive initiatives. This article outlines a basic requirement for effective use of these strategies, namely the need to replace the simplistic assumption that adversaries are “rational, unitary” actors with more specific “actor-specific behavioral models” essential for understanding and attempting to influence different adversaries.