Broadcast Control Channel Jamming: Resilience and Identification of Traitors

Abstract

In this paper, we address the problem of countering jamming of broadcast control channels in wireless communication systems. Targeting control traffic on a system, e.g., BCCH channel in GSM, leads to smart attacks that can be four orders of magnitude more efficient than blind jamming. We propose several schemes based on coding theory and its applications that can counter both external and internal attackers (traitors). We introduce a T-(traitor) resilient scheme that requires less than (Tlog <sub xmlns:mml="http://www.w3.org/1998/Math/MathML" xmlns:xlink="http://www.w3.org/1999/xlink">T</sub> N) <sup xmlns:mml="http://www.w3.org/1998/Math/MathML" xmlns:xlink="http://www.w3.org/1999/xlink">2</sup> control information transmissions and guarantees delivery of control information against any coalition of T traitors. The proposed scheme also allows the identification of persistently jamming traitors.