Philosophical Psychology · 1999 · 19 citations · 9 references
HumanitiesNeurosciencePsychologyCognitive NeurosciencePhilosophy Of MindVisual PerceptionConsciousnessPhilosophy Of PerceptionSpatial CognitionSpatial ExperienceSpatial PerceptionSpatial RepresentationMental Representation Of SpacePerceived SpacePerceptual RepresentationPerceptual SpaceRepresentational SpaceSensory Spatial ExperienceVisual Perception Of Space
ABSTRACT According to representionalists, qualiaÐ the introspectible properties of sensory experienceÐ are exhausted by the representational contents of experience. Representationalists typically advocate an informational psychosemantics whereby a brain state represents one of its causal antecedents in evolutionarily determined optimal circumstances. I argue that such a psychosemantics may not apply to certain aspects of our experience, namely, our experience of space in vision, hearing, and touch. I offer that these cases can be handled by supplementing informational psychosemantics with a procedural psychosemantics whereby a representation is about its effects instead of its causes. I discuss conceptual and empirical points that favor a procedural representationalism for our experience of space.
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John Rowan · Self & Society · 1997 · 1K citations
Humanities, Philosophy, Psychology +17
The architecture of representation
Rick Grush · Philosophical Psychology · 1997 · 143 citations