HumanitiesPhilosophyEthicsModern PhilosophyTheory Of JusticeMoral PhilosophyMoral VirtueNormative EthicsVirtue EthicsRight Action TheorySocial Function Of Performance
Socrates argues in the Republic that a certain condition of soul is both best for its possessor and the source of just or right action towards others. He calls this condition ‘justice’, but in order not to beg the question I shall refer to it as the prescribed condition. I shall not be concerned in this paper with the first half of Socrates' thesis, but only with the way the prescribed condition of soul expresses itself in action. A number of questions arise here, for Socrates' conception of just action extends beyond the common understanding to include the performance of that social function for which one is fitted by nature. I shall disregard this extension, however, and restrict myself to one crucial question: what grounds are there of a non-analogical kind for the assertion that a person whose soul is in the prescribed condition will never act in a way which would be agreed by Socrates and the vulgar to be wrong?
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