Financial Management · 1998 · 58 citations · 4 references
BusinessEconomicsFinanceAgency TheoryFinancial EconomicsInvestment ManagementAdverse SelectionInvestmentInvestor TargetingPension FundsPension Plan FundingPension PolicyEmployee Retirement Income SecurityInstitutional TargetingPension Fund InvestingTarget-based Investing
John R. Nofsinger is an Assistant Professor of Finance at Marquette University. Proponents claim that economically targeted investments (ETIs) can earn a prevailing risk-adjusted rate of return while also providing an additional economic benefit to the plan participants. This paper discusses the fallacies in the reasoning behind ETIs. In short, the structure that would make ETIs acceptable under the fiduciary standards of the Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA) may also create a lemons problem which makes ETIs poor investments, on average. An agency problem derived from the organizational structure of public pension plans can exacerbate the lemons problem. The empirical evidence is consistent with this hypothesis. I find that the risk-adjusted portfolio returns associated with funds using ETIs are low.
4
Separation of Ownership and Control
Eugene F. Fama, Michael C. Jensen · The Journal of Law and Economics · 1983 · 19.1K citations
Public Pension Fund Activism in Corporate Governance Reconsidered
Roberta Romano · Columbia Law Review · 1993 · 416 citations
Does Targeted Investing Make Sense?
Ronald D. Watson · Financial Management · 1994 · 42 citations