The Journal of Business · 2005 · 60 citations · 62 references
ManagementCorporate GovernanceFinanceAgency TheoryCapital StructureCorporate FinanceCapital Structure AnalysisCapital Structure DesignCapital Structure DeterminantsCapital Structure ModelingCapital Structure TheoryOwnership StructureCorporate Debt StructureCorporate Financing BehaviorCorporate Ownership StructureEquity Ownership StructureEquity Structure AnalysisFirm Financial PerformanceFirm PerformanceOwnership Structure Effects
We develop a model of the interaction of firms' capital and ownership structures. The structures are designed to trade off managerial discipline versus managerial initiative. Debt features constrain managerial choice following poor firm performance. Equity ownership dispersion increases managerial initiative, by granting some managerial freedom following high firm performance. The empirical predictions are: equity ownership should be concentrated when debt is closely held, effective debt covenants are present, bankruptcy procedures and the institutional environment are creditor friendly, and board representation of lenders is commonplace. By contrast, equity should be dispersed if long-term investments are more important than short-term project selection.
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A Survey of Corporate Governance
Andrei Shleifer, Robert W. Vishny · The Journal of Finance · 1997 · 16.2K citations · Full text
American Economic Review · 2013 · 15.2K citations