Journal of money credit and banking · 2013 · 185 citations · 32 references
BusinessFinanceInsuranceBankingFinancial EconomicsInsurance EconomicsBanking RegulationDeposit InsuranceFinancial CrisesFinancial RiskBanking Crisis RiskBanking FragilityDeposit Insurance During Banking CrisesHousehold Deposit BehaviorNatural Experiment Evaluation
Using evidence from Russia, we carry out what we believe to be the literature's cleanest test of the direct impact of deposit insurance on market discipline and study the combined effect of a banking crisis and deposit insurance on market discipline. We employ a difference‐in‐difference estimator to isolate the change in the behavior of a newly insured group (i.e., households) relative to an uninsured “control” group (i.e., firms). The sensitivity of households to bank capitalization diminishes markedly after the introduction of deposit insurance. The traditional wake‐up call effect of a crisis is muted by this numbing effect of deposit insurance.
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Bank regulation and supervision: what works best?
James R. Barth, Ross Levine · Journal of Financial Intermediation · 2003 · 2.3K citations
Law, Banking Law, Regulatory Policy +12
Market discipline and deposit insurance
Asli Demirgüç‐Kunt, Harry Huizinga · Journal of Monetary Economics · 2004 · 668 citations