Publication | Closed Access
Candidate Indistinguishability Obfuscation and Functional Encryption for all Circuits
1.1K
Citations
23
References
2013
Year
Unknown Venue
Theory Of ComputingCryptographic PrimitiveEngineeringIndistinguishability ObfuscationInformation SecurityCryptographic ProtectionGeneral CircuitsFormal MethodsData PrivacyComputer ScienceFunctional EncryptionCoding TheoryCandidate Indistinguishability ObfuscationObfuscation (Software)Data SecurityCryptographyCryptanalysis
In this work, we study indistinguishability obfuscation and functional encryption for general circuits: Indistinguishability obfuscation requires that given any two equivalent circuits C <sub xmlns:mml="http://www.w3.org/1998/Math/MathML" xmlns:xlink="http://www.w3.org/1999/xlink">0</sub> and C <sub xmlns:mml="http://www.w3.org/1998/Math/MathML" xmlns:xlink="http://www.w3.org/1999/xlink">1</sub> of similar size, the obfuscations of C <sub xmlns:mml="http://www.w3.org/1998/Math/MathML" xmlns:xlink="http://www.w3.org/1999/xlink">0</sub> and C <sub xmlns:mml="http://www.w3.org/1998/Math/MathML" xmlns:xlink="http://www.w3.org/1999/xlink">1</sub> should be computationally indistinguishable. In functional encryption, cipher texts encrypt inputs x and keys are issued for circuits C. Using the key SK <sub xmlns:mml="http://www.w3.org/1998/Math/MathML" xmlns:xlink="http://www.w3.org/1999/xlink">C</sub> to decrypt a cipher text CT <sub xmlns:mml="http://www.w3.org/1998/Math/MathML" xmlns:xlink="http://www.w3.org/1999/xlink">x</sub> = Enc(x), yields the value C(x) but does not reveal anything else about x. Furthermore, no collusion of secret key holders should be able to learn anything more than the union of what they can each learn individually. We give constructions for indistinguishability obfuscation and functional encryption that supports all polynomial-size circuits. We accomplish this goal in three steps: - (1) We describe a candidate construction for indistinguishability obfuscation for NC <sup xmlns:mml="http://www.w3.org/1998/Math/MathML" xmlns:xlink="http://www.w3.org/1999/xlink">1</sup> circuits. The security of this construction is based on a new algebraic hardness assumption. The candidate and assumption use a simplified variant of multilinear maps, which we call Multilinear Jigsaw Puzzles. (2) We show how to use indistinguishability obfuscation for NC <sup xmlns:mml="http://www.w3.org/1998/Math/MathML" xmlns:xlink="http://www.w3.org/1999/xlink">1</sup> together with Fully Homomorphic Encryption (with decryption in NC <sup xmlns:mml="http://www.w3.org/1998/Math/MathML" xmlns:xlink="http://www.w3.org/1999/xlink">1</sup> ) to achieve indistinguishability obfuscation for all circuits. (3) Finally, we show how to use indistinguishability obfuscation for circuits, public-key encryption, and non-interactive zero knowledge to achieve functional encryption for all circuits. The functional encryption scheme we construct also enjoys succinct cipher texts, which enables several other applications.
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