Political Sequences and the Stabilization of Interparty Competition

TLDR

This study is the first broad cross‑regional analysis of electoral volatility, using the most extensive data set available. The article investigates why some democracies and semi‑democracies develop stable party systems while others experience high electoral volatility. The study finds that regimes inaugurated earlier exhibit lower electoral volatility, that parties’ functions differ by the timing of democracy’s inception, and that the stabilization of party competition depends on when democracy was born rather than its age, supporting path‑dependence theories.

Abstract

This article examines why some democracies and semi-democracies develop relatively stable party systems, while others continue to be roiled by high levels of electoral volatility. It is the first broadly cross-regional analysis of electoral volatility, and it is based on the most extensive data assembled on electoral volatility. Our most original finding is that competitive regimes inaugurated in earlier periods have much lower electoral volatility than regimes inaugurated more recently, even controlling for a variety of other factors that have been hypothesized to affect electoral volatility. Parties had very different functions according to when democracy was inaugurated, and these congenital differences had longterm effects on the stabilization of party competition. What matters for the stabilization of party competition is when democracy was born, not how old it is. Our results support social science approaches that emphasize historical sequences and path dependence.