Alfred Schutz, His Critics, and Applied Phenomenology

Abstract

Recently Alfred Schutz’s attempt at a phenomenological solution to methodological and conceptual problems in the social sciences has been subjected to careful scrutiny. Some critics of Schutz have questioned the philosophical adequacy of his approach to phenomenology and the problem of intersubjectivity; others have questioned his relevance for comparative sociology. Objectivist critics such as Barry Hindess lament the implication they derive from Schutz, that social science is nothing more than &dquo;a special kind of story-telling&dquo;. In the present essay, I draw on critiques of Schutz’s phenomenology of the social world as a way of clarifying Schutz’s limited intentions and assessing the real limitations of his work. I want to suggest that Schutz’s social phenomenology can provide a basis for a sociological enterprise which he himself did not attempt- the comparative analysis of extant lifeworlds. Applied phenomenology, as I term this extension of Schutz’s thought, parallels the logic of interpretive sociology: it moves back and forth between a phenomenological a priori and interpretations of lifeworldly events, just as Max Weber moved between conceptual universals, ideal types, and interpretations of historical events. Applied phenomenology is an attempt to move beyond narrowly conceived methodological concerns to more decisive sociological issues. It seeks to provide for lifeworldly investigations what Weber provided for history- a comparative analytic approach grounded in situations and actions of individuals, based on an epistemology which takes cognizance of the social locations of actors and the interpreter.