Toward an African Moral Theory*

Abstract

IN the literature on African ethics, one finds relatively little that consists of normative theorization with regard to right action, that is, the articulation and justification of a comprehensive, basic norm that is intended to account for what all permissible acts have in common as distinct from impermissible ones.1 By “African ethics” I mean values associated with the largely black and Bantu-speaking peoples residing in the sub-Saharan part of the continent, thereby excluding Islamic Arabs in North Africa and white Afrikaners in South Africa, among others. The field lacks a well-defended general principle grounding particular duties that is informed by such values and that could be compared to dominant Western theories such as Hobbesian egoism or Kantian respect for persons. In this article, I aim to help develop such a principle.2 Some have approximated this project on occasion, but no one has made it a primary aim that has been pursued in a systematic, analytic way.3 Furthermore,the attempts so far, in my judgment, err in one of two major ways. They either advocate principles that clearly cannot capture core aspects of African values and hence are “too Western,” on the one hand, or they suggest principles that promise to do so but cannot as they stand since they are too vague or limited, on the other. My goal is to present an ethical principle that not only grows out of African soil and differs from what is widespread in the West, but also is specific and complete—or that at least has more of these qualities than what one currently finds in the literature. I begin by clarifying the nature of my project in more detail (section I). I explain that I seek a theory of rightness that rationally reconstructs primarily those values associated with talk of “ubuntu” and cognate terms that are prevalent among sub-Saharan Africans. I also present criteria by which to judge whether a theory of right action grounded on ubuntu is acceptable. I evaluate a theory by the extent to which it accounts for two classes of particular moral judgments, those that are deemed uncontroversial to more or less the same degree by both Africans and Westerners, and those that tend to be deemed uncontroversial more by Africans than by Westerners. In the following section, I distinguish between six distinct theories that are found in, or suggested by, the literature on African ethics, and I contend that one promises to account for all these commonsensical intuitions much better than the others (section II). Then, I refine the theory in a crucial respect so that it is more precise and complete (section III). I conclude the paper by noting several ways in which the theory still needs to be developed in future work (section IV). In seeking to construct an African theory of right action, my aim is to develop a principle that sub-Saharan Africans ought to believe, given adherence to claims they typically deem to be less controversial than it. Hence, this largely epistemic project is neither simply moral anthropology nor even straightforwardly normative ethics. First, it is not merely descriptive, for I am not just recounting what sub-Saharan Africans, or a majority of them, happen to believe about rightness. I go beyond moral anthropology in that I seek to unify variegated commonsensical beliefs and to argue that one such unification (which may not be widely held) is better than others. Second, this project is also not plainly prescriptive, for I do not assert that the favoured theory is in fact true, in other words, that people should indeed conform to it. I argue that there is strong epistemic reason to hold it, in relation to certain moral intuitions common to sub-Saharan Africa and in comparison to other theoretical expressions of African morality. I do not claim that the theory is more justified than any non-African conception of morality, let alone that it corresponds to the moral facts. My goal is to present a fundamental and general principle prescribing right actions that is epistemically justified relative to the circumscribed set of African competitors and that could in future work be paired up against Western moral theories. To obtain focus in the search for an attractive African normative principle, I address the (English-speaking) literature that comes closest to my project. Most of this literature analyzes the values associated with the term “ubuntu” and related terms in sub-Saharan Africa and draws out their practical implications for political power, workplace organization and the like. “Ubuntu” is a word used by the Zulu people of South Africa,4 and is difficult to translate into English because it has many different connotations associated with it.5 Roughly, it means humanness, and it often figures into the maxim that “a person is a person through other persons.” This maxim has descriptive senses to the effect that one's identity as a human being causally and even metaphysically depends on a community. It also has prescriptive senses to the effect that one ought to be a mensch, in other words, morally should the in certain ways. the for the South African and a of the normative connotations of to to has are are are and and what It is to is is up in In this article, I the ways that the literature ubuntu as grounding a normative ethical theory of right action at least to such a ubuntu as a or a of a of as a To the more of a of what the of ubuntu and to present criteria for an moral I intuitions that of ubuntu it be to distinguish between two of such those by and Africans to the same and those more often by Africans than by Westerners. I seek a theory by ubuntu that accounts for both of First, moral that are by both of ubuntu and Western people in both it is by and to people for to have with to at least not in or to is, to from their to for a for to on a I it these are no the intuitions that I Africans hold more often than Westerners, I the that I do not mean to suggest that all sub-Saharan let alone all in them, hold I claim are moral more common among Africans than are values that are more widespread in the sub-Saharan part of the than in North or They are values that are more often found not only a certain of from to South Africa, but also a of in that from to African They are also values that more often in the literature on African than in that on Western ethics. I am of not I am to develop a moral theory that has an African and differs from what one finds in and it be to a principle that and these of they be less to the Western I a of often for Africans than for Westerners, it is to in the of as to seeking In the political is and is typically as a morally to of or to In many African a is found and all in the with the Some African have to to a and of different from the in the and the in on the of the people in a a of in which a a majority of not a in but the as a is, a has been not aim to but with other by seeking with in the of to a fundamental and aim of as to seeking By I mean any that could be to a and in one reason to an could be the fact that because and to the same degree in the In to such a for many African believe it to to with the of a of whether to and thereby the from their or to a between the and the two from South Africa, an ubuntu is for to a than to political in the of the and the of the South African have ubuntu to be with the or any that could to largely on a as to a In many African is in common and it is that should be for the of the neither in to a in of nor simply to for one's The of a is the of work should not be to for or for but to others. is one reason so many African in the not at least that morally one to African against Western and to certain of to largely on the of as to The of an to help others are typically deemed in African than in in the tend to that should largely the one may for one has a right to what one for been a right to in of to a or a right to what one has by from a to others what they have no right to is not of as a but as being In a of Africans that one is morally to help to the extent that one and that others with not into the of much one ought to or is the of the widespread have two and the of the is for to the of the to and more Africans than that it is permissible to such as so as one not to others and as to and in of this is a by in to a that of two of at a the and the found that the often to work by or the African not and in The that of deemed the other morally the the Africans the Africans the to more about practical than about it is common among Africans, and more so than among Westerners, to that one has moral to with one's and to the of This not mean that African values or but it mean that in moral is given to whether to to and as to a African people there is strong moral reason to by a and is often and indeed because of at more than The is not merely one is morally to one's or one is to they are these are of widespread in Western The is the claim that one has to and in the a that is much less common in the have moral six both Western and African and six more African than by which to evaluate moral theories in the of this I seek to a principle that both and all The field is not of such a principle, and it is my in the of this to I it my to a principle that all of the commonsensical moral and that is is about the in which and to other in African with that is with respect to and others on my with this I it is that at least many African are as moral to be of I am that to is to account for the this may be as such an I am not out to an of the nature of African I that I seek to develop a moral theory that is at I do so since I ethical on and since it is a and project to those accounts of ubuntu that no at or that could account for the right to to these they In this section, I out that there are six theoretical of ubuntu to be found in the literature. I distinguish between them, and argue that one promises to do much better than the other at for all of the intuitions in the is the account of ubuntu as a moral action is right just as it a an is to the extent that it This of ubuntu that there is to about human nature that It is by of of the South African which has on to the of ubuntu from the of the human in my is not different from what the of ubuntu from the that conception of the of is in other words, that what is about human to be their for or Kantian respect for is a Western theory that cannot many of the African but not Western intuitions In respect for means respect for the for the theory has for the moral duties to in to and in or to in the there is to respect for human in terms of human African that such a principle African the of African is human Africans have a for To and their all human are a given community. The of is the principle of African and this is only in the community. a is a moral by for the of this conception of respect for human is more African in than the Kantian I that it also to account for several of the respect means human as the in the it cannot account for the of and promises for such actions not or In it is respect for reason to seek or to than In the from that have the of and be for there much in them, they be much less at and with that is to a merely between the of on the one hand, and and on the other. In for is not by the or even common of such and many Africans morally even in such a The principle of respect for to account for a of core values associated with to action is right just as it the of an is to the extent that it to the of one's to the of ubuntu in is a more It is a common in the by the from and both of of African as a of of of of as the and the of human being as the of all moral that and moral be to and for in any action or that to the of the of The this of ubuntu is the any an focus on human has grounding for against or as means to the To this a theory that such at a fundamental action is right just as it the of others their an is to the extent that it either or to the of one's this which in basic and it to duties the and it so to the of and it or should of the have different accounts of the and of what as their not which there are and what it is to them, in to that this theory has for all the intuitions at In and which are morally from many an African be as ways to human that of in terms of needs or with in and in and and in a conception of the other than which the theory action is right just as it to others and thereby an is to the extent that it not one's nature as a This is the dominant of African in the the maxim “a person is a person through other to be a for an to develop I ubuntu this moral is as a of moral is to more this means more and more into with others. the goal is is of on that be a human is to one's by the of others on that with is as it to a human of being the for a moral to it is the of one's human and one's to in is of the of of This theory on nature or for with the do not to the present one in to of I that fundamental on has that a to and that no one one to Then, to to person so as to in not be for the theory that to do so by other in since other in the only by which in this the theory to for one's to this be to into the so that an is right and only it one's nature the of others. the this of the theory still the that it let alone up one's for others even for one's since one's thereby this the of ubuntu argue that one's for person be such a in the of one's nature that one could not more of it one to whether to help others is a to the of one's I the true, the present theory to all the intuitions I have I the to an attractive of I I should help for this theory that the basic reason to do so not my for is that it help by more of a or a better a better fundamental of I ought to help others not to the fact that it be for or at least not merely to this but to the fact that it be for them, an that a by cannot that one that for the of others is either or a means one's as the present that it is one's that has fundamental moral to the two accounts of ubuntu as a moral that the in to the whether it be or different of the of ubuntu the that moral not in the but in a between The is to that between and in ethics. morally about as they are in for of a on the one hand, or as being of certain on the other. one morally about people as they are in or as being part of certain The that of have basic moral is not often found in or normative but it is It is a to that dominant Western moral are and African are and so it is that the common theoretical of which I have are all more the than the of action is right just as it is in with is an is to the extent that it to a community. of the and on ubuntu this of the basic is a of and for among the in and in the through and on all such as and The of this to this as the principle or This of ubuntu is too to be an moral it actions only to certain the and not to others. even it to all (which it still be too for the of more not right action is one to the of the of the one's promises seeking in political in and a for many sub-Saharan Africans, morally even they the of is is a of the of that morally action is right just as it and an is to the extent that it to develop community. I is the theoretical of an African to be found in the literature. it in the following of are is for the that or this is to be the for even through are of this to or this account of ubuntu certain as of the that a moral ought to is right is what people what people is This account of ubuntu has the to account for all the intuitions but not as it for it is too are many in which the fundamental to and to could and a of which I in the I have the in the of this to address only crucial in which the norm is the of what or not to any and people not in In the following section, I seek to the less I to the intuitions and this theory at for them, at least relative to the In this section, I aim to the of what or is, so that the to it is better on the literature on African ethics, I that there are distinct has been or could be I is more attractive than the other and the theory by to account for commonsensical moral and is a common of which at least the following distinct First, a given of as part of a to in the person in a Second, the that a of also to be a of it. others in the to also in their claim to identity with the Zulu people merely on the of to also people identity they have common not also the same or that It is to be part of a that not do but the of is one that has and identity consists of people in the their in to their even they do not the same means or the same of and are of The the common of the more people of in terms of their the more they the they these the more they the same for these and the more they to these The of identity is a of in to others in to and one that with those of others. on a are clearly in this a identity duties of it is to it could be morally in of the South African that a common of has no to such a one is not a one is a one to other there is in all a much to to the not merely because the to the identity of others the let a different of one more from a moral of that mean is a certain or has a of as person that person is of help to help person acts so as to help person acts for the the that person has and has been In the there are certain that obtain among these for the is for about the of and The the the the that others the the they are of it, the the of one's of the the on and the the with their or The of and and identity are distinct of there are of identity about the between and in a is little or no typically work for the of both of as part of a that is in there be of a about two people do not are in different and are to person a in thereby person is a or that has been into that of the on but that not they from and but not that is for both their This is an of of that the for but that the neither of as a nor their to common identity has more moral on the of it than identity to between of or often not between them, and the attractive of to is one that The of and identity is morally more than the it is better still with in which help other is less than of a for one a is what has in of ubuntu that is through and the and is to an part of the and to an the of To be or part of the is as an to be or the of others is to have The of the two is what I deem to be the attractive conception of a of is a attractive moral and is the I accounts for the relatively uncontroversial are often between the of many Africans and an the attractive of is one in which people are that is, they have a common of and for one of in terms of of the In the to has a basic that is in Western ethics, conception of the to be differs from what is typically either or African is often as which the present theory better than basic moral in a between people is more than it in an or even these that ought to much for the of others. that the moral to the of identity and is in a that differs from the of in Western ethics. It is less the of those that the of a particular are on those are into and it is more than the of certain believe that one's alone have moral I am in a to the that to action is right just as it identity among people grounded on an is to the extent that it to do so and to the of and this principle still needs and in many which I up in it is less vague and than the I that it is to of the six theoretical accounts of ubuntu in this one accounts for the intuitions from that both and of ubuntu hold the following to be promises and the of it, these are these actions do not they neither to nor any the actions do not for they tend to of and are from a of for the of others. there be in which one of these actions in the could a in the and the nature of the present account of as it to so I do this theory needs into The to do so be to identity and by means of a degree of their of and a more than of and I do not have the to out this and to whether it all intuitions about the of I merely the other the present least with of accounts for the intuitions more or less by Africans and Westerners. it neither that has no moral it not nor that is a permissible means to nor that others is permissible to nor that is permissible it not the that many of but Westerners, the following to be morally impermissible to in the of primarily a of from a of and to through my of to and accounts for these in the political the of identity be one in which all people have to an of one major only is of it is to both identity and in the more than since the less from the political it comes to with those have the nature of ubuntu cannot a theory of which the of to be by about the To merely because a and in to it is by not to in to the of let alone In the to with on and with an to is of not to for the of and hence is not an of is even out to be for so also clearly out it comes to a to to of whether they are by the and others the identity of accounts for the intuitions the of and and in is one to with in other words, to of as a of a and to in human one to the of a common of to the of a In the to in terms of the to identity and or a of for intuitions is a I between my of theory and with an to people have in the They all have a of that their the that ubuntu is a of for human human or of others as of is of part of others or but not it, the is to account for a much of about ubuntu in and which often up on my of is not the of moral that tend to that to do have basic moral the common that ubuntu through is largely the work in this I is not the focus on but the on as to an to what is dominant in Western and in any better with moral about and to help others. the of with is is morally but is not the about right to the or ways of of is one to identity and but it is not the only In the justified normative theory of right action that has an African is the to and to is a of identity and I am that this theory is still and in many ways. I conclude by that one with respect to it, that to be be in to do one an that one but that not one that one acts in a to but it one one be part of the one a of a certain of identity and between and on the one hand, or a between others in one's on the other. is the morally right to Roughly, one be as as in the or one be of in the one at the of the majority of on African believe in at but what is the morally of or one has a of a certain degree of among or a degree of it among should one one cannot it it even to of at a and should one identity and human in are there on the one may one in the only by of in the is the right to there means of the of that not any at these one could a complete of ubuntu as a theory of right it be difficult and to the theory to Western theories. I this has the that the to construct a African moral theory is to develop of ubuntu in terms of a basic to and to the theory developed is more precise and complete than in the literature.