The “Rationality Wars” in Psychology: Where They Are and Where They Could Go

Abstract

Abstract Current psychology of human reasoning is divided into several different approaches. For instance, there is a major dispute over the question whether human beings are able to apply norms of the formal models of rationality such as rules of logic, or probability and decision theory, correctly. While researchers following the "heuristics and biases" approach argue that we deviate systematically from these norms, and so are perhaps deeply irrational, defenders of the "bounded rationality" approach think not only that the evidence for this conclusion is problematic but also that we should not, at least not very often, use formal norms in reasoning. I argue that while the evidence for heuristics and biases is indeed questionable, the bounded rationality approach has its limits too. Most especially, we should not infer that formal norms play no role in a comprehensive theory of rationality. Instead, formal and bounded rules of reasoning might even be connected in a more comprehensive theory of rationality. Notes 1. For instance, they touch on debates about the possibilities and problems of naturalistic approaches to epistemology (e.g., Kitcher, Citation1992; Stein Citation1996, pp. 14–18). At the same time, epistemologists have so far taken little if any notice of the psychological debate about human rationality (exceptions being Bishop, Citation2008; Bishop & Trout, Citation2005; Goldman, Citation2008). This needs to change. Within the space of this essay, I cannot discuss the consequences of the "rationality wars" for naturalizing epistemology. But I hope to lay some groundwork for doing so. 2. The pessimism about human rationality that comes out of the HB approach has also worried naturalistic philosophers (e.g. Kornblith, 1992), though not all (e.g., not an earlier Stich, Citation1980; also, Bishop & Trout, Citation2005, try to exploit the HB approach positively for their own normative naturalism). Again, I must leave this interesting issue for another occasion. 3. There have been a number of critical discussions of the HB approach by philosophers as well, esp. Cohen (Citation1981), Stein (Citation1996), see also Botterill & Carruthers (Citation1999), Cherniak (Citation1986), Schumacher (Citation2002). It would lead too far to discuss them here, however. 4. There are yet further objections from this camp against the HB approach. For instance, Gigerenzer (Citation1996b) argues that the language of biases and heuristics is not really explanatory: talk of a "representative heuristic" or an "availability heuristic" are mere redescriptions of the phenomena. In other words, the HB approach does not really deliver explanations. Samuel, Stich and Bishop's (Citation2002) attempt to argue that the differences between the "heuristic and biases" and the "bounded rationality" approaches are merely superficial overlooks this important point. 5. As Gigerenzer remarks: "Recent studies using paraphrasing and protocols suggest that participants draw a variety of semantic inferences to make sense of the Linda problem: Some 10 to 20% seem to infer that and should be read as a conditional, and some 20 to 50% seem to infer that the alternative 'Linda is a bank teller' implies that she is not active in the feminist movement. … These semantic inferences can lead to choosing T&F rather than T" (1996a, p. 593). I have corrected the last sentence in the quotation. It originally reads: "These semantic inferences can lead to choosing T rather than T&F." This is confused, as Gigerenzer has agreed in personal communication. 6. Gigerenzer often points out that there are serious debates within logic, statistics, and so on over which formal system is correct, which notion of probability adequate, etc. I cannot enter this side of his "reject the norm" argument here. See Vranas, Citation2000, Citation2001; Gigerenzer, Citation2001. 7. I ignore here whether it is best to call these inferences "semantic". 8. Elimination of polysemy helps as well, but not as much as the use of frequentist language, as Gigerenzer has pointed out to me. 9. For instance, Cosmides and Tooby in their approach of an evolutionary psychology of rationality hold similar views. It should be mentioned that Gigerenzer's BR approach is not committed to an evolutionary account of human rationality. For instance, it does not accept the strong modularity thesis that evolutionary psychologists maintain (Cosmides, Citation1989; Cosmides & Tooby, Citation1996). That the two views need to be distinguished is overlooked by Samuels, Stich and Bishop (Citation2002). 10. Indeed, defenders of the HB approach have understood the concept of bounded rationality in this way (e.g., Gilovich, Citation1991; Kahneman, Citation2003). 11. E.g., " … on Kahneman and Tversky's (Citation1996) view of sound reasoning, the content of the Linda problem is irrelevant. All that counts are the terms probable and and, which the conjunction rule interprets in terms of mathematical probability and logical AND, respectively. In contrast, I believe that sound reasoning begins by investigating the content of a problem to infer what terms such as probable mean" (Gigerenzer, Citation1996a, p. 593). 12. I say "let us not generally confuse" them because there are cases of rules where the question of justification and application are not easily distinguishable. This holds especially for the "fast and frugal heuristics" of the BR approach. See Gigerenzer and Sturm (Citation2011). 13. I thank Uljana Feest and Gerd Gigerenzer for valuable comments and criticisms. Cynthia Klohr made helpful suggestions for wording the text. Completion of this essay was supported by the Spanish Ministry for Science and Innovation, Reference number FFI 2008-01559/FISO.