Terrorism Targeting Industrial Chemical Facilities: Strategic Motivations and the Implications for U.S. Security

Abstract

Abstract Policy to reduce the threat of a terrorist attack against industrial chemical facilities—critical infrastructure with potential to cause mass casualties—is being driven by incomplete and, in some cases, incorrect assumptions. This article chronicles incidents by non-state actors directed at the chemical industry and explores the strategic considerations prompting groups to target the industry. By incorporating motivations for targeting infrastructure a more robust, comprehensive risk assessment is realized. Analysis challenging the “insider” threat paradigm and recommendations to ameliorate the potential effects are also presented. These are found to differ substantially from the leading policy measures currently advocated. Acknowledgments The author thanks the MacArthur Foundation and the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace for generous financial support. This work was initiated under contract from the University of California's Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (LLNL). Thanks foremost to Helen Kinsella for providing particularly valuable discussions and comments, as well as appreciation to Charles Perrow, Praveen Abhayaratne, Kevin Moran, Jacob Shapiro, Brian Ingram, and Jennifer Hough. Thanks to Andrew Jayne and other summer 2004 research assistants at the Monterey Institute's Center for Nonproliferation Studies for early research assistance. Notes 1. The editor-in-chief, vice president, and editorial director of the chemical industry's leading trade publication, writing about the September 2001 explosion at a Toulouse plant that killed thirty people, wounded over 3,500 and destroyed a substantial part of the southern French city, “Toulouse Tragedy Postscript,” Chemical Week, 163(37) (3 October 2001), p. 3. 2. U.S. Army, Draft Medical NBC Hazard Analysis of Chemical-Biological-Radiological-Nuclear-High Explosive Threat, Possible Scenarios & Planning Requirements, Army Office of the Surgeon General, October 2001 cited in United States General Accounting Office (GAO), Homeland Security: Voluntary Initiatives are Under Way at Chemical Facilities, but the Extent of Security Preparedness is Unknown. Report to Congressional Requesters, March 2003, GAO-03-439, p. 11, available at (http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-03-439), and in Eric Pianin, “Study Assesses Risk of Attack on Chemical Plant,” Washington Post, 12 March 2002, p. A8. 3. R. Nicholas Palarino and Robert Briggs, Briefing Memorandum for the hearing Combating Terrorism: Chemical Plant Security, U.S. House of Representatives, Subcommittee on National Security, Emerging Threats and International Relations, 19 February 2004, available at (http://reform.house.gov/UploadedFiles/PittMemo.pdf); Lois Ember, “Worst-Case Scenario for Chemical Plant Attack,” Chemical & Engineering News, 80 (18 March 2002), p. 8; and Homeland Unsecured: The Bush Administration's Hostility to Regulation and Ties to Industry Leave America Vulnerable (Washington, DC: Public Citizen, October 2004), pp. 19–40, 63–65, available at (http://www.citizen.org/documents/ACF1B7.pdf). 4. U.S. Senate, Chemical Security Act of 2002: Report to Accompany S. 1602, Report 107-342, 15 November 2002, contains internal reference to data submitted in accordance with EPA-required Risk Management Plans (40 CFR 68). 5. U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Characteristics and Common Vulnerabilities Report for Chemical Facilities (Washington, DC, 17 July 2003), version 1, revision 1. The Congressional Research Service recently released an updated list of those facilities required to file Risk Management Plans (RMP) under the Environmental Protection Agency's (EPA) Clean Air Act. Between 107 and 112 facilities, in a worst-case scenario, are estimated to be capable of effecting more than one million people; 448–488 facilities potentially affecting between 100,000 and 999,999 people; 1,873–2,172 facilities potentially affecting between 10,000 and 99,999 people; and 4,244–4,842 facilities potentially affecting between 1,000 and 9,999 people (Dana A. Shea, “RMP Facilities in the United States as of May 2005,” 27 June 2005, available at [http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/homesec/rmp062705.pdf]. The largest total number of facilities were in Texas (1,134 faciities), followed by Iowa (914), Illinois (913), California (825), Kansas (727), Nebraska (532), and Minnesota (403). 6. Rick Hind and David Halperin, “Lots of Chemicals, Little Reaction,” New York Times, 22 September 2004, p. A23. 7. “Our Unnecessary Insecurity,” New York Times, 20 February 2005, p. D8. 8. Charles E. Schumer, Three Years Later: Is the Federal Government Doing Enough to Protect New York? Grading the Federal Homeland Security Effort in New York and the Nation, issued 15 September 2004, available at (http://schumer.senate.gov/SchumerWebsite/ pressroom/special_reports/2004/HsupstateConfcall091504.pdf). 9. John F. Sopko, “The Changing Proliferation Threat,” Foreign Policy, No. 105 (Winter 1996–1997), pp. 3–20; Richard K. Betts, “The New Threat of Mass Destruction,” Foreign Affairs, 77(1) (January–February 1998), pp. 26–41; Ehud Sprinzak, “The Great Superterrorism Scare,” Foreign Policy, No. 112 (Fall 1998), pp. 110–125; D. A. Henderson, “The Looming Threat of Bioterrorism,” Science, 283 (26 February 1999), pp. 1279–1282; Jessica Stern, The Ultimate Terrorists (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1999); Nadine Gurr and Benjamin Cole, The New Face of Terrorism: Threats From Weapons of Mass Destruction (New York: I.B. Tauris, 2000); Amy E. Smithson and Lesley-Anne Levy. Ataxia: The Chemical and Biological Terrorism Threat and the US Response, Report No. 35 (Washington, DC: Stimson Center, October 2000); Christopher F. Chyba, “Biological Terrorism and Public Health,” Survival, 43(1) (2001), pp. 126–150; Brian M. Jenkins, “Terrorism and Beyond: A 21st Century Perspective,” Studies in Conflict and Terrorism, 24(5) (2001), pp. 321–327; Jean Pascal Zanders, “Assessing the Risk of Chemical and Biological Weapons Proliferation to Terrorists,” Nonproliferation Review, 64 (1999), pp. 17–34; Mark G. Kortepeter and Gerald W. Parker, “Potential Biological Weapons Threats,” Emerging Infectioius Diseases, 5(4) (1999), pp. 523–527; Jessica Stern, “The Prospect of Domestic Bioterrorism,” Emerging Infectious Diseases, 5(4) (1999), pp. 517–522; Edgar J. DaSilva, “Biological Warfare, Bioterrorism, Biodefence and the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention,” Electronic Journal of Biotechnology, 2(3) (1999), ISSN: 0717–3458; and Gregory Koblentz, “Pathogens as Weapons: The International Security Implications of Biological Warfare,” International Security, 28(3) (Winter 2003–2004), pp. 84–122. 10. FBI Special Agent Troy Morgan quoted in Carl Prine, “Chemical Industry Slowly Boosts Security,” Pittsburgh Tribune-Review, 22 June 2003, available at (http://www.pittsburghlive.com/x/tribune-review/specialreports/potentialfordisaster/s_141184.html). 11. Jonathan B. Tucker and Amy Sands, “An Unlikely Threat,” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, 55(4) (July–August 1999), pp. 46–52; Dean A. Wilkening, “BCW Attack Scenarios,” in Sidney D. Drell, Abraham D. Sofaer, and George D. Wilson, eds., The New Terror: Facing the Threat of Biological and Chemical Weapons (Stanford, CA: Hoover Institution Press, 1999), pp. 76–114; Milton Leitenberg, in An Assessment of the Threat of the Use of Biological Weapons or Biological Agents, Biosecurity and Bioterrrorism, Landau Network Centro Volta, 2000; Maurizio Martellini, ed. (Landau Network Centro Volta, 2000); Bruce Hoffman, “Rethinking Terrorism and Counterterrorism Since 9/11,” Studies in Conflict and Terrorism, 25 (2002), pp. 303–315; Margaret E. Kosal, “Near Term Threats of Chemical Weapons Terrorism,” paper presented at the Globalization and WMD Proliferation Networks Conference, Center for Contemporary Conflict, Naval Postgraduate School, 29–30 June 2005, Monterey CA. 12. For vulnerability studies specific to the chemical industry, see: GAO, Homeland Security: Federal and Industry Efforts Are Addressing Security Issues at Chemical Facilities, but Additional Action Is Needed, GAO-05-631T, 27 April 2005, available at (http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d05631t.pdf); Linda-Jo Schierow, Chemical Plant Security, Order Code RL3150 (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service Report, 26 July 2002, updated 20 January 2004), available at (http://www.fas.org/irp/crs/RL31530.pdf); GAO, Homeland Security: Voluntary Initiatives are Under Way at Chemical Facilities, but the Extent of Security Preparedness is Unknown (2003); Paul Baybutt, “Assessing Risks from Threats to Process Plants: Threat and Vulnerability Analysis,” Process Safety Progress, 21 (December 2002), pp. 269–275; Assessment of the Increased Risk of Terrorist or Other Criminal Activity Associated with Posting Off-Site Consequence Analysis Information on the Internet (Washington, DC.: U.S. Department of Justice, 18 April 2000), available at (http://www.4law.co.il/600.pdf); and American Institute of Chemical Engineers, “Guidelines for Analyzing and Managing the Security Vulnerabilities of Fixed Chemical Sites,” (New York: AIChE, American Center for Chemical Process Safety [CCPS], August 2003). For two very good examples analytic models to evaluate vulnerability on a facility-by-facility basis, see: Brian R. Dunbobbin, Thomas J. Medovich, Marc C. Murphy and Annie L. Ramsey, “Security Vulnerabilty Assessment in the Chemical Industry,” Process Safety Progress, 23(3) (September 2004), pp. 214–220, and J. R. Lemley, Vasilis M. Fthenakis, and Paul D. Moskowitz, “Security Risk Analysis for Chemical Process Facilities,” Process Safety Progress, 22(3) (September 2003), pp. 153–161. For a more general vulnerability assessment of U.S. critical infrastructure, including chemical facilities, see Stephen E. Flynn, America the Vulnerable (Harper Collins: New York, 2004), pp. 55–56, 118–121. 13. Statement of Rep. Christopher Shays, 23 February 2004, available at (http://reform.house.gov/UploadedFiles/ShaysChemical.pdf). 14. Jeff Johnson, “Chemical Accident Data: Plethora of Confusion,” Chemical & Engineering News, 77 (15 March 1999), pp. 22–23. 15. American Chemical Council Fact Sheet, “The Business of Chemistry: Essential to Our Quality of Life and the New Economy,” 31 July 2002, available at (http://www.accnewsmedia.com/docs/300/241.pdf), and Cheryl Hogue, “Portman Picked for Trade Office,” Chemical & Engineering News, 83 (28 March 2005), p. 8. 16. The top 50 U.S. chemical companies alone amassed over $253 billion in sales in 2004, a 23% increase from 2003. Alexander H. Tullo, “Top 50 Chemical Producers,” Chemical & Engineering News, 83 (16 May 2005), pp. 17–21. 17. The chemical industry, along with 12 other sectors, such as agriculture, energy, water, banking and finance, and public health, were identified as “critical infrastructures,” in The National Strategy for the Physical Protection of Critical Infrastructures and Key Assets (Washington, DC: Office of the White House, February 2003), pp. xii, 6, 65–66, available at (http://www.dhs.gov/dhspublic/interweb/assetlibrary/Physical_Strategy.pdf). 18. For this document, the definition of critical infrastructure is based on that given in the USA PATRIOT Act of 2001 (PL 107–56) and adopted in the Homeland Security Act of 2002 (PL 107-296) as “systems and assets, whether physical or virtual, so vital to the United States that incapacity or destruction of such systems and assets would have a debilitating impact on security, national economic security, national public health or safety, or any combination of those matters.” 19. Thomas Homer-Dixon, “The Rise of Complex Terrorism,” Foreign Policy, No. 128 (January–February 2002), pp. 52–62. 20. Marsh and McLennan, Large Property Damage Losses in the Hydrocarbon-Chemical Industries a Thirty-year Review (New York: Marsh and McLennan Protection Consultants, 18th edition, 1998). 21. Simon Reynolds, “The Price of Tragedy Rises—Industrial Risk Rates are Out of Step With the New Size of Losses,” Financial Times (London), 9 September 1991. 22. Andrew Wood and Shelina Shariff, “Fallout From Channelview Explosion Keeps on Coming,” Chemical Week, 147(3) (25 July 1990), p. 9. 23. “ARCO Petrochemical Unit Blast Jolts Markets,” Oil & Gas Journal, 88 (16 July 1990), p. 28; and Ian Young and Shelina Shariff, “MTBE Still Leading the Way in Global Octane Surge,” Chemical Week, 146(27) (18 July 1990), p. 16. 24. Frank Swoboda, “Settlement Set in ‘90 Plant Blast,” Washington Post, 4 January 1991, p. A6. 25. “Phillips to Pay $4 Million For Fatal Safety Violations: 23 Workers Died in Chemical Plant Blast,” Atlanta Journal and Constitution (Georgia), 23 August 1991, p. C4. 26. U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, Region III, Office of External Affairs, 66,000 Facilities Need to Prepare “Worst-Case” Scenario Plan, 6 April 1998, available at (http://www.epa.gov/region3/r3press/pr98-162.htm); and Environmental Health Center, Guides to Environmental Risk Management, Chemical Safety in Your Community: EPA's New Risk Management Program, EPA 550-B-99-010, 1999, available at (http://www.nsc.org/public/xroads/general.pdf). 27. Ibid. 28. Kara Sissell, “Dark Cloud or Silver Lining?” Chemical Week, 160(24) (24 June 1998), p. 28, which cites a lower estimate of only 1,500–2,000 oil and chemical plants. 29. In 1999, propane dealers and other flammable fuel users/retailers were excepted from the EPA's Clean Air Act's RMP requirement under the Chemical Safety Information Site Security and Fuels Regulatory Relief Act (P.L. 106-40). As of May 2005, between 12,292 and 14,269 facilities are covered under the Clean Air Act's RMP requirements, of which less than one-quarter are expected to be industrial chemical plants (Dana A. Shea, Congressional Research Service “RMP Facilities in the United States as of May 2005,” 27 June 2005, p. 2). 30. For example, silanes, arsines, phosphines, nitrogen trifluorides, gallium, and selenide compounds. These chemicals are dangerous in terms of lethality and ease of use because most are gases at standard ambient temperature and pressure. 31. Personal communication, 23 November 2004, Kimberly Branshaw, Technical Program Manager, Applied Materials Inc., Santa Clara, CA, USA. 32. For a representative list of companies comprising the industrial chemical infrastructure, see Patricia L. Short, “Global Top 50,” Chemical & Engineering News, 82 (19 July 2004), pp. 11–13. 33. The National Strategy for the Physical Protection of Critical Infrastructures and Key Assets, p. 9. 34. U.S. Senate, Chemical Security Act of 2003, S. 157, introduced 14 January 2003, available at (http://www.theorator.com/bills108/s157.html). 35. Transportation incidents should be the focus of subsequent in-depth study. 36. For every ton of crude oil, six percent is diverted to ethylene, propylene, and benzene production. Less than one percent is used for the synthesis of fine chemicals, which are subsequently converted to pharmaceutical, personal care, and other consumer products. For more on the relationship between petroleum and the chemical industry, see: Mark M. Green and Harold A. Wittcoff, Organic Chemistry Principles and Industrial Practices (Weinheim, Germany: Wiley-VCH, 2003). 37. The Critical Infrastructure Database compiled by the Center for Nonproliferation Studies at the Monterey Institute of International Studies, Monterey, CA, includes over 1000 attacks by terrorist groups on critical physical infrastructure; cyberattacks are not currently included. 38. No terrorist cases originating in Russia or Asia were found in the English-language open literature. 39. Barbara Crossette, “Bhopal's Tragedy Revisited; 10 Years After the Gas,” New York Times, 11 December 1994, p. D4; Dominique LaPierre and Javier Moro, Five Past Midnight: The Epic Story of the World's Deadliest Industrial Accident (New York: Warner Books, 2002); Debora MacKenzie, “Fresh Evidence on Bhopal Disaster: Documents Suggest U.S. Company Was Responsible for Plant's Design and Cut Investment to Maintain Control,” New Scientist, 176 (7 December 2002), p. 6; Mazhar Ullah, “Court Refuses to Reduce Murder Charge Against Bhopal Chief,” Guardian (London), 29 August 2002; Marc S. Reisch, “Twenty Years After Bhopal,” Chemical & Engineering News, 82 (7 June 2004), pp. 19–23; and Scott Baldauf, “Bhopal Gas Tragedy Lives On, 20 Years Later,” Christian Science Monitor (Boston, MA), 4 May 2004. 40. Penny Wark, “The Toxic Legacy of the Explosion of a Pesticide Factory in Bhopal is Still Felt 20 Years On,” The Times (London), 25 May 2004; Rajeshree Sisodia, “A Toxic Legacy,” Al-Ahram Weekly, 2–8 December 2004, available at (http://weekly.ahram.org.eg/2004/719/feature.htm). 41. Substantial effort can be invested in attempts to resolve and reconcile the differences between the official and unofficial fatality and injury estimates. Due to the socioeconomic status of the people living in the area and migration surrounding the Bhopal plant, an exact figure will never be known with meaningful precision. Regardless of the arguments revolving around certain numerical values, the larger figures are part of the public discourse and, thereby, have a chilling and potentially fear-engendering impact on the general populace. Larger values may also appeal to and empower terrorist types motivated to pursue mass-impact or mass-destruction events. 42. Union Carbide Corporation, Bhopal Methyl Isocyanate Investigation Team Report (Danbury, CT: March 1985), and Jackson B. Browning, “Union Carbide: Disaster at Bhopal,” 1993, available at (http://www.bhopal.com/pdfs/browning.pdf). Reprinted from original in Crisis Response: Inside Stories on Managing Under Siege, Jack A. Gottschalk, ed. (Detroit, MI: Visible Ink Press, 1993). 43. Exothermic polymerization of methyl isocyanate (MIC) in the storage tank had been inhibited by added phosgene (the same chemical used as a WWI weapon), as a minority component of the mixture. Enough water entered the tank to with the In this to a of that the temperature of the As the temperature in the storage tank and the of phosgene the by the polymerization of the at a more than the be leading the temperature of the to that a The the to a increase on the and of the storage have also been for chemical in New and New In the of the D. Little the author that the were a part of Union Carbide the Little was the author and are not from Union S. of Bhopal as a presented at the Institution of Chemical on Chemical May 1998, available at U.S. Chemical Safety and Hazard Investigation Hazard Hazard Management, Report No. October J. Bhopal,” in and of Air Quality Chemical Plant and in 4 February p. “Our to the New Times January p. at Post, May 2004, p. and Jeff and Scott in Process Chemical Week, (15 December 2004), p. 3. of Inside a Union Carbide Plant Associated Press, 6 December and S. Threat Factory The July p. New York Times, 9 December p. Threat Factory at Union 6 July and Jenkins, August p. a for the of leading to the of of A and is also known to be a and a and to cause a Under EPA the and most of are was an and in the of the used in by U.S. in have been in the summer 2004 of the in From an The 17 June pp. Chemical Company to Pay for Associated Press, 25 March Ibid. “Court Way for Chemical Week, March 2002), p. 6. and Jenkins, Ibid. the of Chemical Company Associated Press, July on Chemical Plant Blast of Toxic Washington Post, 19 April p. for is a than terrorist the of Chemical Company Chemical Week, July p. 15. Associated Press, August Terrorists Chemical Week, February p. and “An 14 of the Terrorist Associated Press, 27 May to Associated Press, February Chemical Company to Pay for Associated Chemical Week, August p. Ibid. Chemical Ibid. W. to Washington Post, April p. B. at United International May W. to “Terrorism the New Industry,” June Chemical Week, January p. 9. J. on in the International Security, pp. and H. and G. “The United in the The Journal, pp. Report from the of the to the 2002, available at Chemical Week, (28 April p. Cut by Chemical Week, June p. Chemical Week, January pp. and is the Chemical Week, February p. 23. and Oil Chemical Week, January p. 5. Ibid. in Chemical Week, January p. in Chemical Week, February p. 21. in Chemical and “The Young 21 February pp. is the Chemical Week, February p. Associated Press, February The 2000); pp. and Richard The of the 2003), p. in Chemical Kevin The CT: Lawrence & p. J. The A of (New York: Press, pp. “The Young of the The February p. J. The A of pp. Business Week, 21 February p. 42. The Ibid. The pp. United 27 May and Plant After Terrorist Attack,” Chemical Week, June p. 14. the in is and is the to of by to the in May available at in New York Times, May p. F. and Jean M. International Terrorism in the A of 1, Iowa University Press, G. The of the American of and Science, (September p. and L. in The of by David Scott (New York: Press, p. and the Contemporary in paper No. for American Studies, University of and the to June p. 33. the plant at Plant After Terrorist Attack,” Chemical and the Contemporary in Plant Chemical Week, August p. 18. M. Under in Special Report No. (Washington, DC: United States Institute of February 2004), p. available at Plant Blast,” Chemical Week, June p. 35. Personal Harvard November 2004 and 9 November 2004. “Terrorism in An Analysis of the March International Policy Institute for Center available at Associated February 25 April 1994, p. A6. Financial Times (London), October p. 1. Attack Washington Post, 12 December p. by Terrorists,” Chemical Week, May p. 29. and By in Washington Post, 11 May p. and by Terrorists,” Chemical J. was Associated Press, 10 May and in the July p. and Information New York Times, June p. for of American New York Times, 29 February p. includes internal to a the Washington Post, 21 March p. From the Washington Post, 4 July p. H. New York Times, April p. Business 19 April p. and to New York Times, 20 April p. in New York Times, April p. Plans to Journal