The extreme-right and immigration policy-making: Measuring direct and indirect effects

Abstract

The question of who makes immigration policy focuses on the relationship between policy actors and outcomes, but is directly related to the constraints that shape the way that policy-makers make policy. While the radical right in Europe has been generally isolated from making policy, it has been a force in constraining policy development in many countries. A decade ago, Martin Baldwin-Edwards and the author outlined an approach for understanding the politics of immigration. Although they made many references to the extreme right, they never integrated these references into their analytical framework. This contribution is an attempt to deal with that oversight. It first develops an approach to understanding impact on politics and policy, with reference to the French National Front. The objective is to find a way to understand impact in relation to the constraints within which policy-makers shape policy. In the concluding section, the author returns to an analysis of implications for comparative analysis. Notes 1. Georges Lavau explains the breakthrough of the PCF largely in terms of its ability to mobilise and represent the interests of working class voters between the world wars: '… dans cette période décisive, le PC a conquis en milieu ouvrier une place qui était assez largement vacante'. See: Lavau (Citation1981: 72; 34–44) and also Schnapper (Citation1994: 133). 2. The RPR/UDF presented joint candidates in the first round in 35 of the 44 constituencies where the FN came in first on the Right. 3. Opposition to the European Union has been important for attracting votes for FN, but less important than the core issues of immigration and security. New FN voters have been generally more favourable to the EU than 'loyalists', but attitudes of these new voters (towards the EU) are far closer to those of voters for the Communist Party and the extreme-left, than those of the mainstream right. See Schain (Citation1998: 10–14). 4. It is interesting to note that there appears to be no systematic variation in either sample by age. 5. Le Pen's party ultimately won that litigation. See Le Monde, 31 March 1999. 6. It was willingly signed by the FN deputies. See Le Monde, 23 May 1998. 7. See Le Monde, 29 May 1996. Also see CRIDA (Citation1996: 65–67). This is one of three reports issued by CRIDA. 8. In fact the percentages are highest for CGT and FO (54% and 53%), and lowest for CFDT (42%). See CSA Survey 9662093, crosstabs of Q4 and RS 10. These figures appear to have declined since 1994 for the CGT and the CFDT (from 63% and 49%). 9. I have explored the Dreux election in Schain (Citation1987). 10. After the smoke cleared, these were: Bourgogne, Bretagne, Languedoc-Roussillon, Picardie, and Rhône-Alpes. To this list we should probably add Franche-Comté, where a UDF president was elected on 3 April 1998, with the National Front and the Left abstaining. However, after the Conseil d'État invalidated the election of Charles Millon in the Rhône-Alpes in December, 1998, he was ousted by Right–Left majority in a new election in January. See Le Monde, 8 January 1999.