Geopolitics and Cyber Power: Why Geography Still Matters

John B. Sheldon

American Foreign Policy Interests · 2014 · 15 citations · 4 references

Concepts

Abstract

ABSTRACT Implicit in many analyses of the use of cyber power in international politics and foreign policy is that realist geopolitics no longer matter. Even when the term geopolitics is used in such analysis, it is as though the geography has become unmoored from the politics. While there is undoubtedly a geographic foundation to cyberspace because of its physical infrastructure of networked computers, cables, and satellites, it is widely assumed that the geographic setting has no relevance to the political use of cyber power by states and non-state actors. This article argues that while cyberspace shrinks time and space in many obvious ways, the geographic setting still matters in the use of cyber power. Further, comprehending the geopolitics of cyber power can help policymakers and analysts understand the identity, motivations, and intentions of actors. KEYWORDS: cyber powercyberwarfaregeographygeopoliticsinformation operationsinternational politicslittoralurbanization Notes Saul B. Cohen, Geography and Politics in a Divided World (London: Methuen, 1964), 24. For an exception to this, see the following exchange of views: Colin S. Gray, "The Continued Primacy of Geopolitics," Orbis 40, no. 2 (1996): 247–259; and Martin C. Libicki, "The Emerging Primacy of Information," Orbis 40, no. 2 (1996): 261–274. Julian S. Corbett, Some Principles of Maritime Strategy (London: Longman, Greens & Co., 1918), 12. By far the best treatment to date of the physical infrastructure of cyberspace is Andrew Blum's Tubes: A Journey to the Center of the Internet (New York: Ecco, 2012). See John B. Sheldon, "The Rise of Cyberpower," in Strategy in the Contemporary World, 4th ed., ed. John Baylis, James J. Wirtz, and Colin S. Gray (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013), 310–311. See Chris C. Demchak and Peter Dombrowski, "Rise of a Cybered Westphalian Age," Strategic Studies Quarterly 5, no. 1 (Spring 2011): 32–61. For example, the UN Group of Governmental Experts on Developments in the Field of Information and Telecommunications in the Context of International Security emphasizes that states can assert sovereignty in cyberspace. See Report of the Group of Governmental Experts on Developments in the Field of Information and Telecommunications in the Context of International Security A/68/98 (New York: United Nations, June 23, 2013), http://www.un.org/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=A/68/98. See Andrew Blum, "Netscapes (WIRED)," http://andrewblum.net/2009/netscapes-wired-magazine/. See Everett C. Dolman, Astropolitik: Classical Geopolitics in the Space Age (London: Frank Cass, 2002), 60–85. See, for example, Niall Ferguson, The Cash Nexus: Money and Power in the Modern World, 1700–2000 (New York: Basic Books, 2001), 296–299. See U.S. Department of State, Foreign Relations of the United States, Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States, The Paris Peace Conference, 1919, vol. 4, "Minutes of a Meeting of the Council of Four" (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1919), 494–500. See also P. J. Hugill, "The American Challenge to British Hegemony, 1861–1947," The Geographical Review 99, no. 3 (July 2009): 403–425. On the geopolitics of British undersea cabling, see, among others, P. M. Kennedy, "Imperial Cable Communications and Strategy, 1870–1914," The English Historical Review 86, no. 341 (October 1971): 728–752. On the ongoing struggle to preserve Internet neutrality and to keep control of the global cyberspace domain out of the hands of sovereign states, see Laura DeNardis, The Global War for Internet Governance (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2014). On the initial uncertainty of Iranian officials about who was behind the Stuxnet attack, see William Young and Robert F. Worth, "Bombings Hit Atomic Experts in Iran Streets," New York Times, November 29, 2010, http://www.nytimes.com/2010/11/30/world/middleeast/30tehran.html?_r=2&hp&. See Greg Miller and Sari Horwitz, "Justice Dept. Targets General in Leak Probe," Washington Post, June 27, 2013, http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/justice-dept-targets-general-in-leak-probe/2013/06/27/9ad8bc4e-df7c-11e2-b2d4-ea6d8f477a01_story.html. To date, the most authoritative account of the Stuxnet attack can be found in David E. Sanger's Confront and Conceal: Obama's Secret Wars and Surprising Use of American Power (New York: Crown, 2012), 188–225. On the use of cyberspace for espionage, see Joel Brenner, America the Vulnerable: Inside the New Threat Matrix of Digital Espionage, Crime, and Warfare (New York: Penguin Press, 2011). See Terry Pattar, "Cyber Attacks in the Middle East," Current Intelligence 5, no. 3 (Summer 2013), http://www.currentintelligence.net/analysis/2013/7/29/cyber-attacks-in-the-middle-east.html. On terrorist uses of cyberspace, see, among others, Gabriel Weimann, Terror on the Internet: The New Arena, the New Challenges (Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace Press, 2006). See Robert B. Strassler, The Landmark Thucydides (New York: Touchstone Books, 1996); Halford J. Mackinder, Democratic Ideals and Reality (London: Faber and Faber, 2009; first published in 1919); Nicholas J. Spykman, America's Strategy in World Politics: The United States and the Balance of Power (New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Publishers, 2007; first published in 1942); Jakub J. Grygiel, Great Powers and Geopolitical Change (Baltimore, MD: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 2006); and C. Dale Walton, Geopolitics and the Great Powers in the Twenty-First Century: Multipolarity and the Revolution in Strategic Perspective (Abingdon, UK: Routledge, 2007). On the rise of megacities, see Frauke Krass, Surinder Aggarwal, Martin Coy, and Günter Mertins, eds., Megacities: Our Global Urban Future (Dordrecht, Netherlands: Springer, 2014). On this, see Scott Smith, "Shanzai! The Era of DIY Warfare," Current Intelligence 3, no. 8 (August 2011), http://www.currentintelligence.net/columns/2011/7/18/shanzai-the-era-of-diy-warfare.html. On smart cities, see Anthony M. Townsend, Smart Cities: Big Data, Civic Hackers, and the Quest for a New Utopia (New York: W. W. Norton, 2013). On the increasing urbanization of the world's population up to the year 2015, see Department of Economic and Social Affairs, Population Division, World Urbanization Prospects: The 2011 Revision (New York: United Nations, 2011), http://esa.un.org/unup/pdf/WUP2011_Highlights.pdf; on urbanization along the littoral, see National Intelligence Council, Global Trends 2025: A Transformed World (Washington, DC: National Intelligence Council, 2008), 23. For an initial exploration of this issue, see Peter Dombrowski and Chris C. Demchak, "Cyber War, Cybered Conflict, and the Maritime Domain," Naval War College Review 67, no. 2 (Spring 2014): 71–97. See David Kilcullen, Out of the Mountains: The Coming Age of the Urban Guerilla (New York: Oxford University Press, 2013). See, for example, the Australian Army, Future Land Warfare Report: 2014 (Canberra: Directorate of Future Land Warfare, April 2014); and Paul McLeary, "US Army Sees 'Megacities' as the Future Battlefield," Defense News, August 30, 2014, http://www.defensenews.com/article/20140830/DEFREG02/308300027/US-Army-Sees-Megacities-Future-Battlefield. See Mackinder, op. cit., and Spykman, op. cit. Mackinder promulgated the concept of the Heartland, whereas Spykman believed that Mackinder exaggerated its potential power. Spykman promulgated the concept of the Rimland, arguing that it was susceptible to the influence of offshore maritime powers, thus hemming in any dominant Eurasian power. Also implicit in these theories is that Heartland powers tend to be prone to authoritarianism, whereas offshore powers tend to be liberal democracies. On these geopolitical perturbations, see Walter Russell Mead, "The Return of Geopolitics: The Revenge of the Revisionist Powers," Foreign Affairs 93, no. 3 (May/June 2014): 69–79. See Colin S. Gray, "In Defence of the Heartland: Sir Halford Mackinder and His Critics a Hundred Years On," Comparative Strategy 23, no. 1 (Spring 2004): 9–25. See Walton, op. cit. See, for example, John B. Sheldon, "Deciphering Cyberpower: Strategic Purpose in Peace and War," Strategic Studies Quarterly 5, no. 2 (Summer 2011): 95–112. Additional informationNotes on contributorsJohn B. Sheldon John B. Sheldon, Ph.D., is the executive director of the George C. Marshall Institute in Arlington, Virginia; founder and owner of the Torridon Group LLC, a space and cyberspace consultancy; senior fellow at the Atlantic Council; and a senior fellow in Global Security Studies at the Munk School on Global Affairs at the University of Toronto in Canada. Prior to his current positions, John was Professor of Space and Cyberspace Strategic Studies at the U.S. Air Force's School of Advanced Air and Space Studies (SAASS) at Maxwell AFB, Alabama. For over six years, John taught the National Security Space course and founded, directed, and taught the Intelligence, Information, and Cyberspace course. A former British diplomat, John holds bachelor's and master's degrees from the University of Hull, UK, and a Ph.D. in politics and international relations from the University of Reading, UK.

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