Contemporary Accounting Research · 1994 · 66 citations · 16 references
BusinessAccountancyEconomicsAuditingExperimental EconomicsPricing TheoryExternal AuditExternal AuditingMarket ExperimentsTransaction Cost EconomicsAnalytical ModelsAudit IndependenceAudit MarketsExperimental MethodologyExternal Audit IndependenceField Data CollectionInformational RolesLaboratory Markets
Abstract. Auditors, regulators, and academics are interested in the pricing practice of “lowballing” and its relationship to auditor independence. Several analytical models have examined these issues. However, these theories have gone untested primarily due to a lack of field data concerning important environmental variables. In this study, a multiperiod model of lowballing and independence is developed and tested in laboratory markets via the experimental economics methodology. The study contributes to the literature in two respects. First, it represents one of the first studies providing empirical evidence and theory testing of the relationship between lowballing and independence. Second, the model presents a new rationale for low‐ball pricing and its relationship to auditor independence. Lowballing and impairment of independence, occurring without exogenous transaction costs, are caused by positing cross‐sectional variation in audit cost and quality and an informational advantage that accrues to an incumbent auditor‐client pair regarding future variation in these audit dimensions. The model is operationalized in a multiperiod laboratory market consisting of multiple sellers and buyers. Sixteen markets are conducted to test price and reporting predictions of the model. The markets strongly exhibit lowballing behavior, but the exact price predictions are generally not supported. The markets also support reporting predictions, with sellers deviating from truthful reporting (impairing their independence) only when additional future profits are greater than the additional cost of misreporting. Data availability. The laboratory market data used in this paper are available from the authors upon request.
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Auditor size and audit quality
Linda DeAngelo · Journal of Accounting and Economics · 1981 · 5.9K citations
Business, Accountancy, Accounting +12
The Pricing of Audit Services: Theory and Evidence
Dan A. Simunic · Journal of Accounting Research · 1980 · 2.9K citations
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Auditor independence, ‘low balling’, and disclosure regulation
Linda DeAngelo · Journal of Accounting and Economics · 1981 · 1.7K citations
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Jere R. Francis · Journal of Accounting and Economics · 1984 · 707 citations