2006 · 15 citations · 8 references
ComputingComputer ScienceComputer SystemsComputer SecurityCryptographySecurity ProtocolsMutual AuthenticationSecurity Protocol VerificationAd Hoc Network ProtocolsBandwidthChannelsDolev-yao ModelPervasive ComputingProtocol Security ProofsSecure BootstrappingSecurity Properties Of Protocols
In pervasive-computing scenarios users may wish to achieve some degree of security in their interaction with other people or equipment, in contexts where they cannot be confident of the others' long-term identities and where there may be no reliable PKI. We examine the problem of bootstrapping security in an ad-hoc network formed by a group of users.In [4] a number of protocols using low-bandwidth channels involving the human agent(s) "in the loop" to bootstrap secure communication over an untrusted infrastructure were presented, the point being that the attacker's powers are more limited with regard to these empirical channels in one or more respects than in the standard Dolev-Yao view. The two-party protocols proved easy to verify [3] (relative to those weakened powers) by adapting the CSP/FDR-based approach of Casper[9], but the multi-party network-formation protocol (based on a combination of low bandwidth non-forgeable channels and an ordinary Dolev-Yao communication medium) proved more problematic.Addressing the verification of this protocol [11] led to consideration of a number of simplified variants, which appear interesting in their own right.
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Gavin Lowe · 1996 · 587 citations
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N. Asokan, Philip Ginzboorg · Computer Communications · 2000 · 379 citations
Giampaolo Bella, Peter Y. A. Ryan · Journal of Computer Security · 2009 · 213 citations · Full text