American Economic Journal Economic Policy · 2010 · 196 citations · 42 references
Public AffairsEconomicsPublic FinanceLabor EconomicsTax IncidenceTaxationConditional Cash TransfersGeneral Equilibrium Tax IncidenceHousehold EconomicsLabor Tax IncidenceWelfare ReformWork IncentivesCash Transfer EffectsCash Transfer IncidenceEconomic Incidence Of TaxationFamily Labor SupplyLabor Supply AnalysisSingle Parent Work IncentivesTax Incidence On Labor SupplyWage Incidence
The EITC is designed to incentivize work, yet higher labor supply can depress wages, whereas a traditional NIT discourages work and results in larger employer‑to‑worker transfers. The study simulates the economic incidence of the EITC. The simulation shows that EITC payments largely offset by employer wage cuts for low‑income single mothers and even ineligible workers, yielding a $0.73 after‑tax income increase per dollar, whereas a NIT would raise after‑tax income by $1.39 per dollar. JEL codes: H22, H23, H24, H31, J22.
The EITC is intended to encourage work. But EITC-induced increases in labor supply may drive wages down. I simulate the economic incidence of the EITC. In each scenario that I consider, a large portion of low-income single mothers' EITC payments is captured by employers through reduced wages. Workers who are EITC ineligible also see wage declines. By contrast, a traditional Negative Income Tax (NIT) discourages work, and so induces large transfers from employers to their workers. With my preferred parameters, $1 in EITC spending increases after-tax incomes by $0.73, while $1 spent on the NIT yields $1.39. (JEL H22, H23, H24, H31, J22)
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