Extra-Legal Factors in Chicago's Criminal Courts: Testing the Conflict Model of Criminal Justice

Abstract

Recently several researchers using empirical evidence have tested the conflict model of criminal sanctioning. In this paper we develop a theoretical model which embodies propositions derived from the conflict perspective. The model defines three types of discrimination in the criminal sentencing process. They are: (1) labelling processes which define as more serious crimes committed by lower SES persons and blacks; (2) economic discrimination through which lower SES persons and blacks have mediocre attorneys and are less able to make bail, and (3) prejudice, due to which judges and juries assign sentences along racial and occupational lines. Data from the Chicago trial courts show gross inequality in sentencing practice between occupations and races due to prejudice and economic discrimination. We estimate the “cost” of being of a particular occupation or race in terms of pre-trial incarceration and final disposition. With other factors equivalent to those of white proprietors, laborers and non-whites are found to be twice as likely as proprietors to stay incarcerated between arrest and final disposition. Further, other factors being equal, laborers and non-whites are given longer prison sentences than the higher SES groups.