The Concept of Fate in Mencius

Abstract

The concept of fate in Mencius is by no means a new theme in the study of ancient Chinese philosophy, for it has been addressed by a host of scholars. Nevertheless, to a great extent, this subject is still wrapped in obscurity. Particularly on the question of whether Mencius upheld the doctrine of unalterable and unpredictable fate we have hardly been given a conclusive and persuasive answer. Since the concept of fate constitutes an important part of the Mencian, and at large the Confucian, understanding of the supernatural, it is necessary to investigate this concept to answer the question with greater certainty. I intend to shed light on this issue by (1) clarifying two different concepts of fate-moral determinism and blind fate; (2) sorting out three different meanings of the term ming as used by Mencius-life, moral decree, and fate; and (3) distinguishing between two levels of fate-collective and individual. The thesis put forward in the present essay is that Mencius, who often spoke of ming in different senses on the same occasion, upheld the doctrines of both moral determinism and of blind, unalterable fate, but was prone to apply the former to collective entities and the latter to individual persons. The Mencian bilevel distinction, which is at variance with the Moist and Taoist nondistinction in this regard, exercised a profound influence on later Confucians.