Coup-Proofing, Military Defection, and the Arab Spring

Abstract

Abstract Despite implementing coup-proofing measures designed to maintain military loyalty, Arab regimes proved vulnerable to military defection during the Arab Spring. Some Arab militaries defected amid widespread protests, and some remained loyal, while others split between these two options. This article explores civil–military relations in Egypt, Syria, and Yemen and develops a theory of military defection based on three coup-proofing strategies: building parallel security institutions, distributing material incentives, and exploiting communal ties. Building parallel security institutions and material incentives create competition within the security apparatus that motivates military defection. However, exploiting communal ties mitigates these effects and more successfully maintains military loyalty. Keywords: Arab SpringCivil–Military RelationsCoup-ProofingMilitary Defection Acknowledgments The author would like to thank Miriam Elman, Brian Taylor, Eric Rittinger, Seth Jolly, Evan Laksmana, and Trish Siplon for their comments on earlier drafts of this article. Notes 1. I use the term military in reference to a country's regular army, whereas the term security services encompasses special forces, parallel militaries, police, and intelligence personnel. I use security apparatus and armed forces to refer to all of these branches collectively. 2. Michael Albertus and Victor Menaldo, "Coercive Capacity and the Prospects for Democratization," Comparative Politics 44, no. 2 (2012): 151–169; Eva Bellin, "The Robustness of Authoritarianism in the Middle East: Exceptionalism in Comparative Perspective," Comparative Politics 36, no. 2 (2004): 139–157; Guillermo O'Donnell and Philippe Schmitter, Transitions from Authoritarian Rule: Tentative Conclusions About Uncertain Democracies (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1986); Theda Skocpol, States and Social Revolutions (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1979). 3. The tension between maintaining a capable yet subordinate coercive apparatus is what Feaver terms the civil-military problematique, in Peter D. Feaver, "The Civil-Military Problematique: Huntington, Janowitz, and the Question of Civilian Control," Armed Forces & Society 23, no. 2 (1996): 149–178. 4. Daniel Byman and Jennifer Lind, "Pyongyang's Survival Strategy: Tools of Authoritarian Control in North Korea," International Security 35, no. 1 (2010): 44–74; Steven A. Cook, Ruling but Not Governing: The Military and Political Development in Egypt, Algeria, and Turkey (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2007); James T. Quinlivan, "Coup-Proofing: Its Practice and Consequences in the Middle East," International Security 24, no. 2 (1999): 131–165; Sabastiano Rwengabo, "Regime Stability in Post-1986 Uganda: Counting the Benefits of Coup-Proofing," Armed Forces & Society 39, no. 3 (2013): 531–559. 5. Eliezer Be'eri, "The Waning of the Military Coup in Arab Politics," Middle Eastern Studies 18, no. 1 (1982): 69–81. Be'eri documents 55 coup attempts across the Middle East from 1949 to 1980, half of which were successful: Syria (16 attempts), Iraq (9), Sudan (9), Yemen (7), Egypt (3), Lebanon (2), Algeria (2), Morocco (2), Mauritania (2), Libya (1), Jordan (1), and South Yemen (1). 6. Bellin, "The Robustness of Authoritarianism in the Middle East: Exceptionalism in Comparative Perspective"; Jason Brownlee, " … And Yet They Persist: Explaining Survival and Transition in Neopatrimonial Regimes," Studies in Comparative International Development 37, no. 3 (2002): 35–63; Marsha Pripstein Posusney and Michelle Penner Angrist, Authoritarianism in the Middle East: Regimes and Resistance (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2005). 7. Aaron Belkin and Evan Schofer, "Coup Risk, Counterbalancing, and International Conflict," Security Studies 14, no. 1 (2005): 140–177; Quinlivan, "Coup-Proofing: Its Practice and Consequences in the Middle East." 8. Quinlivan, "Coup-Proofing: Its Practice and Consequences in the Middle East," 141. 9. Ibid., 148–149. 10. Some scholars argue that reducing military capacity by decreasing defense spending is the most effective way to undermine coups. For a useful review of this argument, see Justin Clardie, "The Impact of Military Spending on the Likelihood of Democratic Transition Failure: Testing Two Competing Theories," Armed Forces & Society 37, no. 1 (2011): 163–179. 11. In an attempt to keep their armed forces happy, for example, defense expenditures among Middle Eastern and North African regimes are nearly double the global average. 12. Bellin, "The Robustness of Authoritarianism in the Middle East: Exceptionalism in Comparative Perspective"; Byman and Lind, "Pyongyang's Survival Strategy: Tools of Authoritarian Control in North Korea"; Cook, Ruling but Not Governing: The Military and Political Development in Egypt, Algeria, and Turkey; Mehran Kamrava, "Military Professionalization and Civil-Military Relations in the Middle East," Political Science Quarterly 115, no. 1 (2000): 67–92. 13. In Gulf states, oil rents are sufficient to sustain the government's patronage networks (see Steffen Hertog, "Rentier Militaries in the Gulf States: The Price of Coup-Proofing," International Journal of Middle East Studies 43, no. 3 (2011): 400–402). In countries without significant oil wealth, ruling regimes have financed their militaries through a combination of foreign aid and a commitment to "pay the military first" (see Bellin, "The Robustness of Authoritarianism in the Middle East: Exceptionalism in Comparative Perspective," 148). 14. Quinlivan, "Coup-Proofing: Its Practice and Consequences in the Middle East." See also Risa Brooks, Political-Military Relations and the Stability of Arab Regimes, Adelphi Paper 324 (New York: Oxford University Press, 1998); Cynthia Enloe, Ethnic Soldiers: State Security in Divided Societies (Athens: University of Georgia Press, 1980). 15. It is important to note that communal coup-proofing strategies do not automatically result from the presence of communal divisions within society. For a regime to implement a communal strategy, a particular group or groups must be privileged within the security apparatus. 16. Brooks, Political-Military Relations and the Stability of Arab Regimes, Adelphi Paper 324. 17. Brian D. Taylor, Politics and the Russian Army: Civil-Military Relations, 1689–2000 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003), 6. 18. Aurel Croissant et al., "Beyond the Fallacy of Coup-ism: Conceptualizing Civilian Control of the Military in Emerging Democracies," Democratization 17, no. 5 (2010): 950–975. 19. Bellin, "The Robustness of Authoritarianism in the Middle East: Exceptionalism in Comparative Perspective," 143. 20. Stephen Biddle and Stephen Long, "Democracy and Military Effectiveness: A Deeper Look," The Journal of Conflict Resolution 48, no. 4 (2004): 525–546; Ulrich Pilster and Tobias Bohmelt, "Coup-Proofing and Military Effectiveness in Interstate Wars, 1967–99," Conflict Management and Peace Science 28, no. 4 (2011): 331–350. 21. Bellin, "The Robustness of Authoritarianism in the Middle East: Exceptionalism in Comparative Perspective"; Albertus and Menaldo, "Coercive Capacity and the Prospects for Democratization." 22. David Art, "What Do We Know About Authoritarianism After Ten Years?" Comparative Politics 44, no. 3 (2012): 351–373. 23. Jason Seawright and John Gerring, "Case Selection Techniques in Case Study Research: A Menu of Qualitative and Quantitative Options," Political Research Quarterly 61, no. 2 (2008): 300–301. 24. Alexander L. George and Andrew Bennett, Case Studies and Theory Development in the Social Sciences (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2005); Andrew Bennett and Colin Elman, "Qualitative Research: Recent Developments in Case Study Methods," Annual Review of Political Science 9 (2006): 455–476. 25. This article provides a theory of military defection behavior, not regime change. While scholars have long argued that the military's loyalty is necessary for preventing regime change in authoritarian systems (see Paul D'Anieri, "Explaining the Success and Failure of Post-Communist Revolutions," Communist and Post-Communist Studies 39, no. 3 (2006): 331–350; Mark N. Katz, "Democratic Revolutions: Why Some Succeed, Why Others Fail," World Affairs 166, no. 3 (2004): 163–170; Terence Lee, "The Armed Forces and Transitions from Authoritarian Rule: Explaining the Role of the Military in 1986 Philippines and 1998 Indonesia," Comparative Political Studies 42, no. 5 (2009): 640–669; Skocpol, States and Social Revolutions), this factor is not sufficient, as regime overthrow can result from any number of factors. 26. This definition is consistent with that used in recent research on this topic. See, for example, Terence Lee, "The Military's Corporate Interests: The Main Reason for Intervention in Indonesia and the Philippines?," Armed Forces & Society 34, no. 3 (2008): 491–502; David Pion-Berlin and Harold Trinkunas, "Civilian Praetorianism and Military Shirking During Constitutional Crises in Latin America," Comparative Politics 42, no. 4 (2010): 395–411. 27. Eric Nordlinger, Soldiers in Politics: Military Coups and Governments (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, 1977), 66–68. 28. Cook, Ruling but Not Governing: The Military and Political Development in Egypt, Algeria, and Turkey, 16. 29. Lee, "The Armed Forces and Transitions from Authoritarian Rule: Explaining the Role of the Military in 1986 Philippines and 1998 Indonesia"; Michael McFaul, "Transitions from Postcommunism," Journal of Democracy 16, no. 3 (2005): 5–19; William R. Thompson, "Organizational Cohesion and Military Coup Outcomes," Comparative Political Studies 9, no. 3 (1976): 255–276; Ekkart Zimmerman, Political Violence, Crises, and Revolutions: Theories and Research (Cambridge, MA: Schenkman Publishing, 1983). 30. Lee, "The Armed Forces and Transitions from Authoritarian Rule: Explaining the Role of the Military in 1986 Philippines and 1998 Indonesia," 645. 31. Lee, "The Military's Corporate Interests: The Main Reason for Intervention in Indonesia and the Philippines?"; Taylor, Politics and the Russian Army: Civil-Military Relations, 1689–2000, 16. 32. For this reason, understanding defection requires knowledge of both structural and proximate causes. See Aaron Belkin and Evan Schofer, "Toward a Structural Understanding of Coup Risk," The Journal of Conflict Resolution 47, no. 5 (2003): 594–620. 33. Lee, "The Armed Forces and Transitions from Authoritarian Rule: Explaining the Role of the Military in 1986 Philippines and 1998 Indonesia," 646–647. 34. Theodore McLauchlin, "Loyalty Strategies and Military Defection in Rebellion," Comparative Politics 42, no. 3 (2010): 333–350. 35. Pion-Berlin and Trinkunas, "Civilian Praetorianism and Military Shirking During Constitutional Crises in Latin America." 36. Donald Horowitz, Ethnic Groups in Conflict, 2nd ed. (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2000), 528–529. Horowitz refers to communal strategies based on ethnicity, but his logic similarly applies to other communal groups. 37. Ibid., 534. 38. Eva Bellin, "Reconsidering the Robustness of Authoritarianism in the Middle East: Lessons from the Arab Spring," Comparative Politics 44, no. 2 (2012): 127–149; Philippe Droz-Vincent, "Authoritarianism, Revolutions, Armies and Arab Regime Transitions," The International Spectator 46, no. 2 (2011): 5–21; Derek Lutterbeck, "Arab Uprisings, Armed Forces, and Civil-Military Relations," Armed Forces & Society 39, no. 1 (2013): 28–52. 39. These arguments typically accompany those that posit that cultural affinity and a concern over the military's reputation motivate defection, though these arguments are similarly problematic for the reasons discussed above and described in greater detail in the following section. 40. Yezid Sayigh, "Agencies of Coercion: Armies and Internal Security Forces," International Journal of Middle East Studies 43, no. 3 (2011): 403. 41. Muhammad Abdul Aziz and Youssef Hussein, "The President, the Son, and the Military: The Question of Succession in Egypt," Arab Studies Journal 9/10, no. 1/2 (2001/2002): 80–82. 42. Tarek Masoud, "The Road to (and From) Liberation Square," Journal of Democracy 22, no. 3 (2011): 25. 43. Harb, "The Egyptian Military in Politics: Disengagement or Accommodation?," 285–286. 44. Zoltan Barany, "The Role of the Military," Journal of Democracy 22, no. 4 (2011): 28. 45. Abdul Aziz and Hussein, "The President, the Son, and the Military: The Question of Succession in Egypt," 86. 46. Cook, Ruling but Not Governing: The Military and Political Development in Egypt, Algeria, and Turkey. 47. International Crisis Group, Popular Protest in North Africa and the Middle East (I): Egypt Victorious? (Middle East/North Africa Report No. 101, 2011), 16; Stephen Gotowicki, "The Military in Egyptian Society," in Phebe Marr, ed., Egypt at the Crossroads: Domestic Stability and Regional Role (Washington, DC: National Defense University Press, 1999), 107–108; Harb, "The Egyptian Military in Politics: Disengagement or Accomodation?," 285. 48. Amnesty International, Broken Promises: Egypt's Military Rulers Erode Human Rights, 2011. 49. Brooks, Political–Military Relations and the Stability of Arab Regimes, Adelphi Paper 324, 26. 50. International Crisis Group, Popular Protest in North Africa and the Middle East (VI): The Syrian People's Slow-Motion Revolution (Middle East/North Africa Report No. 108, 2011), 27. 51. Eyal Zisser, "The Syrian Army on the Domestic and External Fronts," in Armed Forces in the Middle East: Politics and Strategy (Abington: Routledge, 2002), 119. 52. Quinlivan, "Coup-Proofing: Its Practice and Consequences in the Middle East," 135–137. 53. International Crisis Group, Uncharted Water: Thinking Through Syria's Dynamics (Middle East Briefing No. 31, 2011), 2. 54. Salwa Ismail, "The Syrian Uprising: Imagining and Performing the Nation," Studies in Ethnicity and Nationalism 11, no. 3 (2011): 543. 55. International Crisis Group, Uncharted Water: Thinking Through Syria's Dynamics. 56. Joshua Landis, "The Syrian Uprising of 2011: Why the Asad Regime Is Likely to Survive to 2013," Middle East Policy 19, no. 1 (2012): 74. 57. "Middle East and North Africa," The Military Balance 111, no. 1 (2011): 330. 58. Bassam Haddad, "Syria's Stalemate: The Limits of Regime Resistance," Middle East Policy 19, no. 1 (2012): 87. 59. Sarah Phillips, Yemen's Democracy Experiment in Regional Perspective: Patronage and Pluralized Authoritarianism (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2008), 68–69. 60. Although official government statistics under Saleh place Yemen's defense budget at around 20 percent of government spending, these figures are notoriously unreliable and likely underestimate spending on the security apparatus to a considerable degree. See ibid., 68–70. 61. Ibid., 70–71. 62. Ibid., 97. 63. Khaled Fattah, "Yemen: A Social Intifada in a Republic of Sheikhs," Middle East Policy 18, no. 3 (2011): 82. 64. Though not a military officer, Sadiq al-Ahmar's political position as leader of Yemen's most powerful tribal alliance gives him much control over tribal militiamen. Sadiq al-Ahmar and Ali Mohsen al-Ahmar are not related. 65. Sarah Phillips, "Who Tried to Kill Ali Abdullah Saleh?," 13 June 2011, ForeignPolicy.com, (accessed March 4, 2013). 66. International Crisis Group, Popular Protest in North Africa and the Middle East (II): Yemen Between Reform and Revolution (Middle East/North Africa Report No. 102, 2011), 11. 67. Project on Middle East Political Science, Jordan, Forever on the Brink. POMEPS Briefings 11, 9 May 2012.