Counterforce and Alliance: The Ultimate Connection

Abstract

I America's drift to counterforce nuclear strategies is neither perverse nor accidental. The emphasis on counterforce became a notable aspect of the nuclear strategy of the Carter Administration, at least in its promulgation of Presidential Directive 59 in July 1980 and its promotion of the MX intercontinental missile; and it continues in the strategy of the Reagan Administration, embodied in the weapons system decisions of October 2, 1981. To grasp the rationale of counterforce, it is necessary to understand the logic of extended deterrence. For ultimately it is its adherence to alliance commitments that skews the United States' strategy toward counterforce weapons and targeting and warps American doctrines of response toward the first use of nuclear weapons, prejudicing crisis stability and increasing the likelihood of escalation to nuclear war. Few realize how intertwined American weapons and strategies are with American commitments. And few understand how integral to the entire foreign policy stance of the United States has been the strategic paradigm of deterrence and alliance that the U.S. has maintained for thirty-five yearsand therefore, how much would have to change, if we set about to achieve an alternative, more stable, nuclear stance that might provide greater safety for Americans in an age of pervasive nuclear danger. But also, few see how much is actually changing, under the surface of the familiar strategic and diplomatic arrangements, precisely because the objective conditions that are the requisites of America's present stance are not being fulfilled.