The Four Doctrines of Self-Executing Treaties

A distinction has become entrenched in United States law between treaties that are “self-executing” and those that are not. The precise nature of this distinction—indeed, its very existence—is a matter of some controversy’ and much confusion. More than one lower federal court has pronounced the distinction to be the “most confounding” in the United States law of treaties. A tremendous amount of scholarship has sought to clarify this distinction, but the honest observer cannot but agree with John Jackson’s observation that "[t]he substantial volume of scholarly writing on this issue has not yet resolved the confusion” surrounding it. The continuing, and remarkably candid, judicial confusion over this issue will, I hope, excuse yet another attempt to bring some coherence to the doctrine. In this article, I argue that much of the doctrinal disarray and judicial confusion is attributable to the failure of courts and commentators to recognize that for some time four distinct “doctrines” of self-executing treaties have been masquerading as one. With a view to furthering the development of doctrine in conformity with constitutional allocations of power, I identify these four “doctrines,” as reflected in the self-execution decisions of the Supreme Court and the lower federal courts, and I examine the very different types of analysis that they call for.