Nuclear War at Sea

Abstract

The subject of nuclear warfare at sea, and the difficulties of controlling escalation of conflict at sea, has so far drawn very little attention from the strategic community.' This is despite the fact that more than a third of the nuclear weapons of the U.S. and the Soviet Union are deployed on sea-based platforms; the control of these weapons by central national authorities is physically loosest; and the doctrines and operational procedures associated with sea-based nuclear weapons are subject to less well-defined thresholds and, in some cases, are quite provocative. Moreover, there are good reasons for believing that the first use of nuclear weapons could take place at sea, and for concern that the escalation dynamics of nuclear warfare in this theater are far less constrained than those that would attend nuclear operations on land. There are several reasons for this lack of attention. The nuclear weapons based at sea-both tactical and strategic-are less visible. The details of their deployment and their supporting infrastructure are generally closed to public scrutiny. And the employment doctrines for these weapons have never been officially presented in a form that would permit informed critiques to be readily explicated. Some of the considerations that require serious attention are as follows: -Accidents at sea. -The attractiveness of ships as nuclear targets. -The launch autonomy of naval commanders. -Problems raised by dual-capable systems and platforms. -Anti-submarine warfare (ASW) strategy.