JCMS Journal of Common Market Studies · 2006 · 91 citations · 29 references
Social SciencesPublic PolicyBank RegulationBankingState Aid LawBanking RegulationEuropean GovernanceEuropean IntegrationEuropean PoliticsEuropean Union InstitutionsEuropean Union StudiesBank Restructuring Through NationalizationEuropean RelationsEuropean Union Economic PolicyEuropean Union Policy-makingEuropean Union State Aid RulesPublic Sector BanksState Aid ClausesState Aid Procedure
Europeanization studies generally assume that EU integration can disturb certain aspects of national policy‑making but cannot alter core systemic characteristics. This paper demonstrates that European integration can indeed overturn key features of national policy‑making structures. Such change requires proactive subnational actors, as shown by German public banks confronting EU state‑aid rules. In this case, private banks bypassed national structures to secure abolition of state guarantees, thereby disadvantaging private banks competitively.
Abstract Much of the Europeanization literature assumes that while European integration may upset certain features of national policy‐making structures, it will not be able to modify systemic characteristics. This article shows that central features of national policy‐making structures may be overthrown by European integration. However, this usually requires a proactive attitude by subnational actors with an interest in further integration. The argument is illustrated by the case of German public banks and the conflict with regard to EU state aid rules. In this case, competing private banks finally chose to circumvent existing national policy‐making structures in order to obtain the abolition of state guarantees, which it was considered put private banks at a competitive disadvantage.
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