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Democratic Governance Beyond the Nation-State:
497
Citations
58
References
2000
Year
Regime AnalysisDemocracyPublic PolicyGovernance FrameworkInternational RelationsGovernance (Urban Studies)Global PoliticsComparative PoliticsInternational OrganizationOutput LegitimacyLiberal DemocracyInternational PoliticsMost DeficitsPolitical ScienceSocial SciencesGeopoliticsDemocratic Governance BeyondInternational Institutions
International institutions enhance system effectiveness and input legitimacy but fail to meet democratic standards, a shortfall that critics argue cannot be remedied and which underpins two skeptical hypotheses: that a transnational demos cannot exist and that national sovereignty and supranationality are in zero‑sum conflict. The study aims to revise the notion that a transnational demos cannot exist by providing theoretical distinctions to facilitate future empirical work. The authors propose concrete institutional reforms that challenge the zero‑sum view, arguing that democratic legitimacy in a denationalized society requires a mixed constitution of majority procedures and negotiation mechanisms. The authors conclude that framing democracy beyond the nation‑state as a binary between effective problem‑solving and democratic processes is misguided.
International institutions not only increase system effectiveness or output legitimacy, but are also a normatively plausible response to the problems for democracy that are caused by globalization. In this way, international institutions also increase input legitimacy. It is therefore a false approach to pin down the problem of democracy beyond the nation-state as a choice between `effective problem-solving through international institutions' and `democratic political processes'. At the same time, it is indisputable that the actual functioning of these international institutions does not meet democratic standards. By correctly pointing to the deficits of current international institutions, sceptics too quickly conclude that most deficits in the working of international institutions cannot be remedied. The sceptical argument is founded on two more or less explicit background hypotheses that can be empirically challenged. The first background hypothesis states that a demos cannot exist at the transnational level. I will modify this statement in theoretical terms and offer some conceptual distinctions that may prepare the ground for further empirical investigation. The second background hypothesis of the sceptics postulates a zero-sum relationship between national sovereignty and supranationality. I will put forward some concrete institutional proposals that undermine the zero-sum logic of the sceptics, concluding that in a denationalized society, democratic legitimacy can only be achieved by a mixed constitution comprising majority procedures and negotiation mechanisms.
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