What is a validity claim?

Joseph Heath

Philosophy & Social Criticism · 1998 · 223 citations · 0 references

Concepts

TL;DR

Habermas’s theory of communicative action treats validity claims as central, yet he never precisely defines the term, noting only that truth is a validity claim and that rightness and sincerity are analogous to truth. This paper investigates the analogy between rightness and sincerity and truth, aiming to show that they share two key characteristics. It argues that rightness and sincerity must each be the designated value in an appropriate logical system and serve as the central notion in a theory of meaning for their respective speech acts. The study finds that these two characteristics connect understanding and justification, but also uncovers a tension because the autonomy of linguistic meaning appears to require a uniform logic and thus a single validity claim.

Abstract

Even though the concept of a 'validity claim' is central to Habermas's theory of communicative action, he has never given a precise definition of the term. He has stated only that truth is a type of validity claim, and that rightness and sincerity are analogous to truth. This paper explores the basis of this analogy, arguing that rightness and sincerity must share at least two characteristics with the truth predicate: each must be the designated value in an appropriate system of logic, and each must serve as the 'central notion' in a theory of meaning for some corresponding class of speech acts. It is these two characteristics that establish the internal connec tion between understanding and justification that Habermas's more general project requires. However, there is an unnoticed tension between these two characteristics, since the relative autonomy of linguistic meaning from specific contexts of use appears to require that speech acts be governed by a uniform logic, and thus by a single validity claim.