Economics of Transition · 1996 · 337 citations · 11 references
ManagementBusiness AdministrationCorporate GovernanceAgency TheoryChange GovernanceDemocratizationEnterprise TransformationGovernance ReformPrivatizationState-owned Enterprise GovernanceState-owned Enterprise ReformState-owned EnterprisesChinese EconomyInterferenceState Enterprise OwnershipState-owned Enterprise AccountabilityState-owned Enterprise Corporate GovernanceState-owned Enterprise Ownership ReformState-owned Enterprise PrivatizationState-owned Enterprise Restructuring
Abstract The past reforms of state‐owned enterprises in China delegated many effective control rights to managers while maintaining ultimate control rights for the Party and government. The result is that either the agency costs are high because managers lack accountability or the political costs are high because the government causes political interference. Reform of state‐owned enterprises in China should aim at reducing both political and agency costs, which can be done through depoliticization, effective corporate governance, and deserialization. In particular, China needs an ownership transformation with a combination of privatization, denationalization, and pluralization; a state assets management system to limit political influence from the government; and corporatization to establish effective corporate governance which may take a variety of forms.
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Autonomy and Incentives in Chinese State Enterprises
Trish Groves, Yongmiao Hong, John McMillan et al. · The Quarterly Journal of Economics · 1994 · 757 citations
China's Evolving Managerial Labor Market
Theodore Groves, Yongmiao Hong, John McMillan et al. · Journal of Political Economy · 1995 · 392 citations