HumanitiesClassicsAncient PhilosophyNew TestamentRoman HistoryBiblical ExegesisClassical AntiquityAncient Theory Of MatterNature Of Evil
Plotinus historically portrayed matter as an evil or negative substance, a view evident in early treatises such as Enneads 2.4 and later works after his break with the Gnostics. The study seeks to explain why the negative view of matter gained prominence during Plotinus’ opposition to Gnosticism and whether dualist perspectives resurfaced afterward. The analysis concludes that Plotinus consistently upheld the doctrine that matter is evil throughout his life, and the break with the Gnostics did not ultimately alter this stance.
IN THE DISCUSSION which followed his paper Plotin et les Gnostiques,1 M. Puech suggested that the language and thought of Plotinus concerning matter could be said to have developed. Before the break with the Gnostics which is revealed in Enneads 3.8, g.8, s,5, and 2.9, thinks M. Puech, Plotinus conceived of matter as a kind of evil substance, whereas he later came to regard it as imaginee comme un miroir. After questioning, he explained that he inclined to the view that Plotinus had refornmed the pessimistic dualism that can be found in his earlier treatises, if not abandoned it altogether, and he was ready to accept the implication that after the break with the Gnostics, Plotinus tended to abandon the suggestion that matter is evil. The two treatises which appear in places to teach most clearly the inherent evil of matter are Enn. 2.4 and i.8. The former of these is the twelfth in Porphyry's list of the treatises in chronological order, and was therefore written between 2S4 and 263 A.D. The treatises against the Gnostics are numbers thirty to thirtythree in chronological order, all therefore having been written after 265; and those containing expressions suggesting that matter is mere negativity include 2.6 (I7th in chronological order), 2.5 (25), 3.6 (26) and 6.3 (44). Enn. 2.4, which, as has already been noticed, appears to contain the theory of matter as evil, also supports the view of it as negativity. We can at once conclude, therefore, that Plotinus appears to have nmaintained the doctrine that nmatter is evil soon after he began to write and again at the time of his death, and that his break with the Gnostics did not, at least ultimately, affect his thought on this issue. We nmay explain this by suggesting that the view of matter as negativity, which appears along-side the apparently more dualistic view in the early tract 2.4, obtained complete supremacy in Plotinus' min(d for a period when his opposition to Gnosticism was at its most intense, but if this is so, (and I do not think it can be proved), then apparently dualist views on this particular issue returned when the main struggle with Gnosticism was over.