Family Business Review · 2006 · 147 citations · 49 references
BusinessBusiness AdministrationCorporate GovernanceAgency TheoryCorporate FinanceFamily BusinessFamily Business GovernanceFamily Business ManagementFamily Business PerformanceFamily Firm GovernanceFamily OwnershipOwnership StructureAgency In Family FirmsCeo TurnoverCorporate Performance MeasurementFamily Business Ownership
This study investigated the tenure of CEOs in a sample of 304 listed companies in Taiwan; 63 firms were family controlled, 241 were not. The results show that CEO turnover is significantly lower in family firms and its relationship to corporate performance is negative. CEO ownership and board ownership are not significant in explaining the length of family CEO tenure. These findings imply that family boards can still effectively replace the CEO despite relatively low ownership. From the ownership structure perspective, this study suggested that the agency theory is applicable for nonfamily firms in Taiwan, but unsuitable for family firms.
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