Worker Knowledge of Pension Provisions

Olivia S. Mitchell

Journal of Labor Economics · 1988 · 165 citations · 8 references

Concepts

TL;DR

Myopia about pension incentive structures is troubling because workers may save or consume suboptimally, change jobs, or retire earlier than they would if better informed about pensions. This article evaluates the quality of workers’ information regarding pension offerings. It does so using both administrative records and worker reports of pension provisions. The study finds that missing and incorrect pension information is widespread, with better knowledge among unionized, higher‑income, better‑educated, and senior employees, while minorities have less knowledge than whites and women are better informed than men.

Abstract

This article evaluates the quality of workers' information regarding pension offerings using both administrative records and worker reports of pension provisions. Missing and incorrect information is wide-spread. Unionized employees, higher income workers, better educated workers, and those with seniority are better informed about their pensions. There are also demographic differences: minorities have less pension knowledge than whites, but women are better informed than men along several pension dimensions. Myopia about pension incentive structures is troubling since workers may save or consume suboptimally, change jobs, or retire earlier than they would have if equipped with better pension information.

References

8