How Theories Represent

Abstract

An account of scientific representation in terms of partial structures and partial morphisms is further developed. It is argued that the account addresses a variety of difficulties and challenges that have recently been raised against such formal accounts of representation. This allows some useful parallels between representation in science and art to be drawn, particularly with regard to apparently inconsistent representations. These parallels suggest that a unitary account of scientific and artistic representation is possible, and our article can be viewed as laying the groundwork for such an account—although, as we shall acknowledge, significant differences exist between these two forms of representation. 1 Introduction 2 Partial Structures View 3 An Example: Representation and Analogy in Superconductivity 4 Representation and Isomorphism in Art 5 Inconsistent Representations 6 Reduction and Disentangling: Callendar and Cohen and Contessa 7 From Art to Science 8 Challenges to the Formal Account 8.1 Necessity 8.2 Sufficiency 8.3 Logic 8.4 Mechanism 8.5 Style 8.6 Misrepresentation 8.7 Ontology 9 The Formal Account Defended 9.1 Preamble: ‘informational’ versus ‘functional’ accounts 9.2 Necessity 9.3 Logic and sufficiency 9.4 Mechanism 9.5 Style 9.6 Misrepresentation 9.7 Ontology 10 Conclusion