Philosophy, psychiatry & psychology · 2004 · 105 citations · 23 references
Social SciencesPhilosophyPsychologyCognitive PsychologyPhilosophy Of MindSocial PerceptionPhilosophy Of PerceptionTheory Of MindDelusional ThinkingWittgensteinian Fideism
A popular approach to monothematic delusions in the recent literature has been to argue that monothematic delusions involve broadly rational responses to highly unusual experiences. Campbell (2001) calls this the empiricist approach to monothematic delusions, and argues that it cannot account for the links between meaning and rationality. In place of empiricism, Campbell offers a rationalist account of monothematic delusions, according to which delusional beliefs are understood as Wittgensteinian framework propositions. We argue that neither Campbell's attack on empiricism nor his rationalist alternative to empiricism is successful.
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Monothematic Delusions: Towards a Two-Factor Account
Martin Davies, Max Coltheart, Robyn Langdon et al. · Philosophy, psychiatry & psychology · 2001 · 372 citations
Persecutory delusions and attributional style
Sue Kaney, Richard P. Bentall · British Journal of Medical Psychology · 1989 · 282 citations
M. P. Alexander, Donald T. Stuss, D. Frank Benson · Neurology · 1979 · 278 citations
Medicine, Neurology, Psychiatry +12