Valuing Risk in the Workplace: Market Price, Willingness to Pay, and the Optimal Provision of Safety

Henry W. Herzog, Alan M. Schlottmann

The Review of Economics and Statistics · 1990 · 91 citations · 10 references

Concepts

TL;DR

The compensating wage differential theory predicts that jobs with undesirable characteristics pay higher wages, yet empirical tests often assume workers' willingness to pay for workplace safety equals market valuations of risk reduction. The study examines the implications of this assumption for implied value of life estimates. In the manufacturing sector, workers' willingness to pay for risk reduction exceeds the market price of such safety measures at current risk levels. © 1990 MIT Press.

Abstract

The theory of compensating wage differentials, attributable to Adam Smith, suggests that jobs with disagreeable characteristics will command high wages, ceteris paribus. Most empirical tests of this theory with hedonic wage equations implicitly assume that workers' willingness to pay for risk reduction (safety) in the workplace through diminished wages and market valuations of the of these reductions are equivalent. It is shown that this is not the case within the manufacturing sector where willingness to pay exceeds the price (cost) of risk reduction at current levels of risk exposure. Implications for implied value of life estimates are also examined. Copyright 1990 by MIT Press.

References

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