Journal of the Royal Statistical Society Series A (Statistics in Society) · 2007 · 221 citations · 121 references
Social SciencesBehavioral SciencesPsychologyCognitive PsychologyDecision AnalysisDecision TheoryBiasExpert ElicitationKnowledge ElicitationProbability JudgmentBiased Probability AssessmentBiasesElicitationElicitation BiasExpert Probability AssessmentHeuristicsProbability AssessmentProbability Elicitation
Summary In the early 1970s Tversky and Kahneman published a series of papers on ‘heuristics and biases’ describing human inadequacies in assessing probabilities, culminating in a highly popular article in Science. This seminal research has been heavily cited in many fields, including statistics, as the definitive research on probability assessment. Curiously, although this work was debated at the time and more recent work has largely refuted many of the claims, this apparent heuristics and biases bias in elicitation research has gone unremarked. Over a decade of research into the frequency effect, the importance of framing, and cognitive models more generally, has been almost completely ignored by the statistical literature on expert elicitation. To remedy this situation, this review offers a guide to the psychological research on assessing probabilities, both old and new, and gives concrete guidelines for eliciting expert knowledge.
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Judgment under Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases
Amos Tversky, Daniel Kahneman · Science · 1974 · 28K citations
Judgment under Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases
Amos Tversky, Daniel Kahneman · 1975 · 23.1K citations
On the psychology of prediction.
Daniel Kahneman, Amos Tversky · Psychological Review · 1973 · 6.3K citations
Subjective probability: A judgment of representativeness
Daniel Kahneman, Amos Tversky · Cognitive Psychology · 1972 · 4.9K citations