The meaning of representation in animal memory

Herbert L. Roitblat

Behavioral and Brain Sciences · 1982 · 411 citations · 192 references

Concepts

TL;DR

A representation is a remnant of previous experience that allows that experience to affect later behavior, and a representational system must specify domain, content, code, medium, and dynamics; behaviorist assumptions have led to neglect of representation in animal behavior, though animal representations may be task‑ and species‑specific. This paper develops a metatheoretical view of representation and applies it to issues concerning representation in animals. The authors address objections to using representation in animal behavior by arguing against claims of indeterminacy and behaviorist parsimony. Representations act as models of environmental regularities at many behavioral levels, and data from spatial memory, delayed matching‑to‑sample, and sequence learning tasks provide foundations for a general theory of animal representations.

Abstract

Abstract A representation is a remnant of previous experience that allows that experience to affect later behavior. This paper develops a metatheoretical view of representation and applies it to issues concerning representation in animals. To describe a representational system one must specify the following: the domain or range of situations in the represented world to which the system applies; the content or set of features encoded and preserved by the system; the code or transformational rules relating features of the representation to the corresponding features of the represented world; the medium , or the representation's physical instantiation; and the dynamics , or how the system changes with time. In part because of the behaviorist assumption that the hypothetical, covert changes occurring in an organism during learning correspond to the overt physical changes that are observed, issues of representation in animal behavior have been largely ignored as irrelevant or misleading. However, it can be inferred that representations, acting as models of environmental regularities, operate at many levels of behavioral functioning, both cognitive and noncognitive. Objections to the use of this concept in explanations of animal behavior, based on the claim that it is indeterminate and on behaviorist considerations of parsimony, can be answered. Animal representations may be specialized in terms of tasks and species. Data from tasks involving spatial memory, delayed matching-to-sample, and sequence learning suggest some foundations for a general theory of animal representations.

References

192