Journal of Political Economy · 1991 · 482 citations · 8 references
Social SciencesBusiness EconomicsEconomicsEconomic DevelopmentIndustrial OrganizationInnovationEconomic GrowthGrowth TheoryProduct InnovationTechnological InnovationEconomic Growth DynamicsEndogenous Growth EquilibriumEndogenous Growth ModelInnovation-driven GrowthR And D IncentivesR And D Race ModelsResearch RacesSteady-state Equilibrium
This paper develops a dynamic general equilibrium model of economic growth. The model has a steady-state equilibrium in which some firms devote resources to discovering qualitatively improved products and other firms devote resources to copying these products. Rates of both innovation and imitation are endogenously determined on the basis of the outcomes of $R & D$ races between firms. Innovation subsidies are shown to unambiguously promote economic growth. Welfare is enhanced, however, only if the steady-state intensity of innovative effort exceeds a critical level.
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A Non-cooperative Equilibrium for Supergames
James W. Friedman · The Review of Economic Studies · 1971 · 1.8K citations
Imitation Costs and Patents: An Empirical Study
Edwin Mansfield, Mark S. Schwartz, Samuel Wagner · The Economic Journal · 1981 · 1.3K citations
Introduction to Probability Theory.
H. C. Fryer, Paul G. Hoel, Sidney C. Port et al. · Journal of the American Statistical Association · 1972 · 808 citations